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Message-ID: <20241203092456.5dde2476@hermes.local>
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2024 09:24:56 -0800
From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>
To: Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@...nel.org>, Leon Romanovsky <leonro@...dia.com>,
Krzysztof Wilczyński <kw@...ux.com>,
linux-pci@...r.kernel.org, Ariel Almog <ariela@...dia.com>, Aditya Prabhune
<aprabhune@...dia.com>, Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.de>, Heiner Kallweit
<hkallweit1@...il.com>, Arun Easi <aeasi@...vell.com>, Jonathan Chocron
<jonnyc@...zon.com>, Bert Kenward <bkenward@...arflare.com>, Matt Carlson
<mcarlson@...adcom.com>, Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@...onical.com>, Jean
Delvare <jdelvare@...e.de>, Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, Jakub Kicinski
<kuba@...nel.org>, Thomas Weißschuh
<linux@...ssschuh.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] PCI/sysfs: Change read permissions for VPD
attributes
On Tue, 3 Dec 2024 14:15:28 +0200
Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org> wrote:
> The Vital Product Data (VPD) attribute is not readable by regular
> user without root permissions. Such restriction is not needed at
> all for Mellanox devices, as data presented in that VPD is not
> sensitive and access to the HW is safe and well tested.
>
> This change changes the permissions of the VPD attribute to be accessible
> for read by all users for Mellanox devices, while write continue to be
> restricted to root only.
>
> The main use case is to remove need to have root/setuid permissions
> while using monitoring library [1].
>
> [leonro@vm ~]$ lspci |grep nox
> 00:09.0 Ethernet controller: Mellanox Technologies MT2910 Family [ConnectX-7]
>
> Before:
> [leonro@vm ~]$ ls -al /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:09.0/vpd
> -rw------- 1 root root 0 Nov 13 12:30 /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:09.0/vpd
> After:
> [leonro@vm ~]$ ls -al /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:09.0/vpd
> -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Nov 13 12:30 /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:09.0/vpd
>
> [1] https://developer.nvidia.com/management-library-nvml
> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@...dia.com>
> ---
> Changelog:
> v3:
> * Used | to change file attributes
> * Remove WARN_ON
> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/61a0fa74461c15edfae76222522fa445c28bec34.1731502431.git.leon@kernel.org
> * Another implementation to make sure that user is presented with
> correct permissions without need for driver intervention.
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1731005223.git.leonro@nvidia.com
> * Changed implementation from open-read-to-everyone to be opt-in
> * Removed stable and Fixes tags, as it seems like feature now.
> v0:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/65791906154e3e5ea12ea49127cf7c707325ca56.1730102428.git.leonro@nvidia.com/
> ---
> drivers/pci/vpd.c | 7 +++++++
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/vpd.c b/drivers/pci/vpd.c
> index a469bcbc0da7..a7aa54203321 100644
> --- a/drivers/pci/vpd.c
> +++ b/drivers/pci/vpd.c
> @@ -332,6 +332,13 @@ static umode_t vpd_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
> if (!pdev->vpd.cap)
> return 0;
>
> + /*
> + * Mellanox devices have implementation that allows VPD read by
> + * unprivileged users, so just add needed bits to allow read.
> + */
> + if (unlikely(pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_MELLANOX))
> + return a->attr.mode | 0044;
> +
> return a->attr.mode;
> }
>
Could this be with other vendor specific quirks instead?
Also, the wording of the comment is awkward. Suggest:
On Mellanox devices reading VPD is safe for unprivileged users.
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