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Message-ID: <willemdebruijn.kernel.256cffcbb2583@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2025 14:39:26 -0500
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...gle.com>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
eric.dumazet@...il.com,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
kees@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next] net: optimize eth_type_trans() vs
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
Eric Dumazet wrote:
> Some platforms exhibit very high costs with CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
> when a function needs to pass the address of a local variable to external
> functions.
>
> eth_type_trans() (and its callers) is showing this anomaly on AMD EPYC 7B12
> platforms (and maybe others).
>
> We could :
>
> 1) inline eth_type_trans()
>
> This would help if its callers also has the same issue, and the canary cost
> would be paid by the callers already.
>
> This is a bit cumbersome because netdev_uses_dsa() is pulling
> whole <net/dsa.h> definitions.
>
> 2) Compile net/ethernet/eth.c with -fno-stack-protector
>
> This would weaken security.
>
> 3) Hack eth_type_trans() to temporarily use skb->dev as a place holder
> if skb_header_pointer() needs to pull 2 bytes not present in skb->head.
>
> This patch implements 3), and brings a 5% improvement on TX/RX intensive
> workload (tcp_rr 10,000 flows) on AMD EPYC 7B12.
>
> Removing CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG on this platform can improve
> performance by 25 %.
> This means eth_type_trans() issue is not an isolated artifact.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>
Good catch.
I guess this applies to many callers of skb_header_pointer.
The protected against risk is that the caller passes a len smaller
than sizeof(buffer), or that __skb_header_pointer/skb_copy_bits cannot
be trusted. The second we could analyze and allow-list.
I wonder if there is a (known?) mitigation. Using sizeof for stack
alloc'd structs in a special (macro) __skb_header_pointer rather than
having the caller pass a separate length arg, __attribute__
((no_stack_protector)), percpu storage, others.
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