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Message-ID: <20260110143300.71048-4-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2026 15:32:57 +0100
From: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@...il.com>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@...l-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@...il.com>,
	Justin Suess <utilityemal77@...il.com>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	"Tingmao Wang" <m@...wtm.org>,
	"Samasth Norway Ananda" <samasth.norway.ananda@...cle.com>,
	"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@...fet.re>,
	"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>,
	konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com,
	"Demi Marie Obenour" <demiobenour@...il.com>,
	"Alyssa Ross" <hi@...ssa.is>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@...gle.com>,
	"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@...il.com>,
	Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/5] lsm: Add hook unix_path_connect

From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@...il.com>

Adds an LSM hook unix_path_connect.

This hook is called to check the path of a named unix socket before a
connection is initiated.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@...il.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  4 ++++
 include/linux/security.h      | 11 +++++++++++
 net/unix/af_unix.c            |  9 +++++++++
 security/security.c           | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 8c42b4bde09c..1dee5d8d52d2 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -317,6 +317,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, post_notification, const struct cred *w_cred,
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, watch_key, struct key *key)
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY && CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_path_connect, const struct path *path, int type, int flags)
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_stream_connect, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
 	 struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 83a646d72f6f..382612af27a6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1931,6 +1931,17 @@ static inline int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
+
+int security_unix_path_connect(const struct path *path, int type, int flags);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+static inline int security_unix_path_connect(const struct path *path, int type, int flags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey);
 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *name, u8 port_num);
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 55cdebfa0da0..3aabe2d489ae 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1226,6 +1226,15 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len,
 	if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode))
 		goto path_put;
 
+	/*
+	 * We call the hook because we know that the inode is a socket
+	 * and we hold a valid reference to it via the path.
+	 */
+	err = security_unix_path_connect(&path, type, flags);
+	if (err)
+		goto path_put;
+
+	err = -ECONNREFUSED;
 	sk = unix_find_socket_byinode(inode);
 	if (!sk)
 		goto path_put;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 31a688650601..0cee3502db83 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -4731,6 +4731,26 @@ int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
+/*
+ * security_unix_path_connect() - Check if a named AF_UNIX socket can connect
+ * @path: path of the socket being connected to
+ * @type: type of the socket
+ * @flags: flags associated with the socket
+ *
+ * This hook is called to check permissions before connecting to a named
+ * AF_UNIX socket.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_unix_path_connect(const struct path *path, int type, int flags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(unix_path_connect, path, type, flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_path_connect);
+
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
 /**
  * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed
-- 
2.52.0


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