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Message-ID: <4bc22faa-2927-4ef9-b5dc-67a7575177e9@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2026 11:45:03 -0500
From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@...il.com>
To: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@...il.com>,
 Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
 Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
 "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, Tingmao Wang <m@...wtm.org>,
 Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@...cle.com>,
 Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@...fet.re>,
 Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>,
 konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com, Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@...il.com>,
 Alyssa Ross <hi@...ssa.is>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
 Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com>, Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>,
 netdev@...r.kernel.org, Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
 Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] lsm: Add hook unix_path_connect

On 1/10/26 09:32, Günther Noack wrote:
> From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@...il.com>
>
> Adds an LSM hook unix_path_connect.
>
> This hook is called to check the path of a named unix socket before a
> connection is initiated.
>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@...il.com>
> Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@...il.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  4 ++++
>  include/linux/security.h      | 11 +++++++++++
>  net/unix/af_unix.c            |  9 +++++++++
>  security/security.c           | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 8c42b4bde09c..1dee5d8d52d2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -317,6 +317,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, post_notification, const struct cred *w_cred,
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, watch_key, struct key *key)
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY && CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
>  
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_path_connect, const struct path *path, int type, int flags)
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_stream_connect, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
>  	 struct sock *newsk)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 83a646d72f6f..382612af27a6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1931,6 +1931,17 @@ static inline int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
>  }
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>  
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
> +
> +int security_unix_path_connect(const struct path *path, int type, int flags);
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +static inline int security_unix_path_connect(const struct path *path, int type, int flags)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
>  int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey);
>  int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *name, u8 port_num);
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index 55cdebfa0da0..3aabe2d489ae 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -1226,6 +1226,15 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len,
>  	if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode))
>  		goto path_put;
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * We call the hook because we know that the inode is a socket
> +	 * and we hold a valid reference to it via the path.
> +	 */
> +	err = security_unix_path_connect(&path, type, flags);
> +	if (err)
> +		goto path_put;
> +
> +	err = -ECONNREFUSED;
>  	sk = unix_find_socket_byinode(inode);
>  	if (!sk)
>  		goto path_put;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 31a688650601..0cee3502db83 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -4731,6 +4731,26 @@ int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
>  
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>  
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
> +/*
> + * security_unix_path_connect() - Check if a named AF_UNIX socket can connect
> + * @path: path of the socket being connected to
> + * @type: type of the socket
> + * @flags: flags associated with the socket
> + *
> + * This hook is called to check permissions before connecting to a named
> + * AF_UNIX socket.
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_unix_path_connect(const struct path *path, int type, int flags)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(unix_path_connect, path, type, flags);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_path_connect);
> +
> +#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
>  /**
>   * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed
Just for awareness,

I'm considering renaming this hook to unix_socket_path_lookup, since as Günther
pointed out this hook is not just hit on connect, but also on sendmsg.

Justin

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