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Message-ID: <20260123202211.2082-2-qikeyu2017@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 04:22:11 +0800
From: Kery Qi <qikeyu2017@...il.com>
To: davem@...emloft.net,
edumazet@...gle.com,
kuba@...nel.org,
pabeni@...hat.com
Cc: horms@...nel.org,
mingo@...nel.org,
tglx@...nel.org,
acme@...driva.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Kery Qi <qikeyu2017@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH] llc: fix resource exhaustion in llc_conn_handler()
llc_conn_handler() does not check the accept queue limit before
creating a new socket for incoming connections. This allows an
attacker to send a large number of SABME PDUs to exhaust system
memory by creating unlimited sockets.
The issue is similar to the TCP SYN flood problem, but LLC lacks
the protection mechanisms that TCP has (like SYN cookies and
accept queue limits).
Add sk_acceptq_is_full() check before creating new socket and
call sk_acceptq_added() after successful socket creation to
properly track the accept queue length. This ensures that the
backlog limit set by listen() is respected.
Fixes: d389424e00f90 ("[LLC]: Fix the accept path")
Signed-off-by: Kery Qi <qikeyu2017@...il.com>
---
net/llc/llc_conn.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/llc/llc_conn.c b/net/llc/llc_conn.c
index 5c0ac243b248..9296b5d6b04a 100644
--- a/net/llc/llc_conn.c
+++ b/net/llc/llc_conn.c
@@ -802,10 +802,15 @@ void llc_conn_handler(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb)
* in the newly created struct sock private area. -acme
*/
if (unlikely(sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) {
- struct sock *newsk = llc_create_incoming_sock(sk, skb->dev,
- &saddr, &daddr);
+ struct sock *newsk;
+
+ if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
+ goto drop_unlock;
+ newsk = llc_create_incoming_sock(sk, skb->dev,
+ &saddr, &daddr);
if (!newsk)
goto drop_unlock;
+ sk_acceptq_added(sk);
skb_set_owner_r(skb, newsk);
} else {
/*
--
2.34.1
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