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Message-ID: <87txpaii2q.fsf@wolfjaw.dfranke.us>
Date: Sun, 17 Feb 2013 19:25:33 -0500
From: Daniel Franke <dfoxfranke@...il.com>
To: Jeremi Gosney <epixoip@...dshell.nl>
Cc: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Any "large verifiers" on the panel?
Jeremi Gosney <epixoip@...dshell.nl> writes:
> You have to assume that if the passwords are compromised, the
> encryption key is as well.
I'm with all those who say that we shouldn't be granting this
assumption. An adversary who has completely compromised a web server
doesn't have to bother cracking password hashes at all. He can just
capture unhashed passwords as they arrive over the wire. If we aren't
completely wasting our time having this competition, then we should
absolutely be thinking about what constitutes a realistic model of
common partial-compromise scenarios, and what features we can add to a
password-hashing scheme in order to make it more secure in that model.
P.S.: A couple people in this thread have been referencing a message
from Peter Gutmann which doesn't seem to have made it to my inbox. Was
that message sent to this list?
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