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Message-ID: <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C7343D2DFA9@uxcn10-tdc02.UoA.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2013 03:24:17 +0000
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@...auckland.ac.nz>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Re: Suggestion: API should include a verifier function
Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@...il.com> writes:
>This isn't necessary: a non-constant time comparison at worst reveals the
>hash, which doesn't give an attacker enough information to break a password
>anyway if we do our jobs right.
Oh yes it can ;-). There's a clever attack that was presented at Kiwicon last
year that turns timing attacks on hashed passwords into partial attacks on the
original passwords. It'll appear in the Crypto Corner column of IEEE Security
and Privacy in (AFAIK) the next issue.
Peter.
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