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Message-ID: <2E94E67E93DF4BB2B90651C111938903@LAPTOPAIR>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2013 21:21:26 -0700
From: "Jeremy Spilman" <jeremy@...link.co>
To: <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Re: Suggestion: API should include a verifier function
LMGTFY:
http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/presentations/TimingAttackPresentation2012.pdf
-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Gutmann
Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 8:24 PM
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Re: Suggestion: API should include a verifier function
Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@...il.com> writes:
>This isn't necessary: a non-constant time comparison at worst reveals the
>hash, which doesn't give an attacker enough information to break a password
>anyway if we do our jobs right.
Oh yes it can ;-). There's a clever attack that was presented at Kiwicon
last
year that turns timing attacks on hashed passwords into partial attacks on
the
original passwords. It'll appear in the Crypto Corner column of IEEE
Security
and Privacy in (AFAIK) the next issue.
Peter.
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