phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Native server relief support for password hashing in browsers

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Message-ID: <CAOLP8p7c_M5e6s2CXepg+bfUAnU9oqOXAPrxWvao-cvjkg9+9w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2014 09:02:24 -0500
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Native server relief support for password hashing in browsers

On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 8:38 AM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com> wrote:
> - Even blake2b is too slow for this competition, though I seem to
> remain in the minority in feeling this way.  What's wrong with r[i] =
> r[i-1]*(prevRow[reverse(i)] | 1) + 12345?

I replaced the hashing in inner loops with simple hashes like this,
and catena-waywardgeek-test runs in 0.024 seconds.  That's a factor of
12X speed-up!  That would put Catena in a competitive performance
range.  It took me about 5 minutes to make the change.

Obviously the output needs to appear more random than the hashed data
I'm now writing to memory in catena-waywardgeek.  That's absolutely no
problem.  Simply compute SHA-512 of the user password, and XOR in the
last row over it.  You can't make random data less random by XORing in
non-random data.  In addition, there is no good way for an ASIC
attacker to speed up this inner loop, because our CPUs have highly
optimized multipliers, and the multiplication now dominates the
runtime.  This makes Catena both memory-hard and compute-time hard.

So... now is it time for the theoreticians to spend 5 weeks to
determine if such a simple hash is OK?  :-)

Bill