phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Native server relief support for password hashing in browsers

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Message-ID: <52DD2C61.8070206@uni-weimar.de>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2014 15:02:09 +0100
From: Christian Forler <christian.forler@...-weimar.de>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Native server relief support for password hashing in browsers

On 19.01.2014 23:39, Solar Designer wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 02:28:20AM +0400, Solar Designer wrote:
>> That said, this may well be beyond scope of PHC (unless something
>> unexpectedly clever yet simple emerges), and Catena's builtin "server
>> relief" is only the tip of the iceberg.  It is very nice that Catena
>> standardizes just one hash type for both server-only and client+server
>> uses (without that functionality built in, it'd end up being 2+ hash
>> type variations), but it doesn't address the more complicated issues.
> 
> BTW, if I understood Catena's server relief design correctly, it looks
> compatible with RFC 5802 (SCRAM), which I happened to have described in
> my own words here (before I learned of the RFC):
>
> http://openwall.info/wiki/people/solar/algorithms/challenge-response-authentication#Stored-on-the-server
> 

Yes, it is indeed the same idea. I think we have to cite your work. :-)

Your protocol is a little bit more sophisticated since it offers
protection against passive adversaries.


> For this algorithm to work, the server only needs H(Hs(password, salt)).
> This is very nice if so, meaning that exact same standardized hash type
> may be used for storage on the server both for SCRAM and for plaintext
> logins (possibly over a secure tunnel).

Yes. This is nice. :-)


Best regards,
Christian
































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