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Message-id: <357CB864-0EA8-4D78-B90C-458D56D2023F@mac.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 14:41:59 -0800
From: Larry Bugbee <bugbee@....com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] A silly (?) consideration for script-friendly hashes
On Jan 24, 2014, at 2:29 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Larry Bugbee <bugbee@....com> wrote:
>> On Jan 24, 2014, at 2:17 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 2:16 PM, Larry Bugbee <bugbee@....com> wrote:
>>>> On Jan 24, 2014, at 2:13 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> just hash the domain in
>>>>> with the salt before using it to hash a password
>>>>
>>>> Good idea, but why not also add userid?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> Because then you need some kind of trusted input so that scripts can't
>>> just fake the userid.
>>
>> Sorry, and perhaps I'm dense, but I don't see why that's a problem.
>>
>
> If the API is Hash(userid, domain, salt, password), then the browser
> can only really verify "domain". How is it going to check that
> "userid" is correct?
Why would it need to if it knew the userid fm the login fields? Perhaps we are talking abut two different problems?
I was thinking the kitten processors would be working on new dictionaries and adding the domain to the hash which would be a good way to cause the attacker to have to generate a fresh set of dictionaries for each site. Fine, but if you add userid (converted to lower/upper case to avoid server mismatches) to the hash they would need a dictionary for each user at that site. ...or at a minimum, they would have to discover the userid for the victim.
Are you thinking of a different use case?
> --Andy
>
>>
>>> At that point, you might as well try to use a
>>> protocol like SRP instead.
>>>
>>> --Andy
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Andy Lutomirski
> AMA Capital Management, LLC
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