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Message-ID: <003c01cf1a1b$9f855bb0$de901310$@cfl.rr.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2014 17:20:15 -0500
From: "Gary W. Hvizdak" <gary.hvizdak@....rr.com>
To: <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: RE: [PHC] Initial (non-proof-read) NeolKDF paper
Resending reformatted for readability ...
-----Original Message-----
From: Gary W. Hvizdak [mailto:gary.hvizdak@....rr.com]
Sent: Saturday 25 Jan 2014 1718
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: RE: [PHC] Initial (non-proof-read) NeolKDF paper
Bill Cox wrote ...
If you would like to see the earliest version and maybe provide some
constructive feedback, please feel free to take a look. It's at:
https://github.com/waywardgeek/noelkdf/blob/master/NoelKDF.odt
--
Bill,
In 2.1 Simplified NoelKDF, the statement ...
value = value*(mem[prevAddr++] | 3) + mem[randAddr++];
... is equivalent to ...
switch ( mem[prevAddr++] | 3 )
{
case 0 : value = mem[randAddr++];
break;
case 1 : value = mem[randAddr++] + value;
break;
case 2 : value = mem[randAddr++] + (value << 1); break;
case 3 : value = mem[randAddr++] + value + (value << 1); break;
default :
}
... which is surely the route an attacker would take.
Cheers,
Gary
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