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Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 17:25:51 +0000
From: Peter Maxwell <peter@...icient.co.uk>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] New password hashing entry: PolyPassHash

On 25 March 2014 15:28, Justin Cappos <jcappos@....edu> wrote:

> Okay, but if you can secure this separate secure system, why not just
> store the password database there and have a well defined interface for
> asking auth questions (like systems such as HoneyWords argue for)?
>

​Because systems with password databases must as an inherent part of their
design be exposed to a much larger attack surface.



>
> I get the notepad / pen argument from a security standpoint.  Of course,
> you have to change this password anytime someone leaves, etc.  I guess
> whether this is a concern depends on your environment.   You also need to
> wait for someone to enter the password / key to be able to use a new system
> upon restart.
>

​Changing the secret key for something like that is dependent on
environment and is a far more involved discussion (it's not as simple a
question as it first appears).​

You also need to wait for someone to enter the private key for a
certificate when starting a server with TLS support, and that's generally
considered ok.



>
> I agree that either way if an attacker can read memory on a running
> server, they can read what is essentially a hashed and salted password
> database.   Of course they can also read plain-text passwords as they are
> entered (for most auth systems).
>

​Yes.  However, we can split this into two categories:

i. The situation whereby the attacker gains full access to memory and the
password database and takes the lot, in one go​.  This isn't any good for
monitoring plaintext passwords as they are entered because there isn't a
persistent access.

ii. The attacker gains full and persistent access.  The exposure of
plaintext passwords will depend on length of compromise and the frequency
upon which users sign-in, i.e. it would be much worse, say, in a company's
internal network than your average web service.

For the most part, we're considering i.  Because with ii. it doesn't matter
how good the PHC winner is, the attacker has won anyway.


So, for i., your scheme is security equivalent to the scheme of storing a
simple master key in memory.  Personally, I see measures of storing a
secret key in memory as part of a defense-in-depth approach as I'm
certainly not going to place all my bets on an attacker not compromising
memory -- the password hashes, in my view, must themselves provide adequate
security even when that secret key is compromised.




>
> I don't think that anyone would disagree that having an offline / uber
> secure mechanism for storing some private data that is used to encrypt
> password hash databases is a big win.   The admin / security team could go
> and access a separate server, copy over a key / password, change them
> diligently as people come and go, etc.   However, from a usability
> standpoint, it seems to be something that organizations often are found not
> to do in practice.
>

You'd be surprised what companies do and don't do in practice.

However, in any case, I'd be very wary of putting too much stock into an
in-memory secret, whether we're talking a simple key or your secret sharing
scheme.



>
> Instead of doing all of this, they could just do "apt-get install
> polypasshash" and then worry about other things...
>

Hmmm.






>
> Thanks,
> Justin
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 10:36 AM, Peter Maxwell <peter@...icient.co.uk>wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 25 March 2014 14:17, Justin Cappos <jcappos@....edu> wrote:
>>
>>> The issue is where does the security team / admins store the key between
>>> reboots?   If it is on disk, then an attacker can trivially find and use
>>> it.   (Several surveys of password breaches have shown that attackers
>>> usually obtain password databases through attacks where they do not have
>>> root access on a live machine.)
>>>
>>>
>> In a previous incarnation, we solved the problem by setting up some
>> custom software akin to keepass/passwordsafe on a secure server that was
>> only accessible to the security team (if an attacker gained access to that
>> machine, we'd have bigger problems than a compromised password database).
>>  There were only about a dozen passwords/keys needing stored and it worked
>> fine.  Worst comes to the worst, a notepad and pen will often suffice :-)
>>  (and has the distinct advantage that it canny be compromised remotely)
>>
>> So in your threat model: on reboot, a member of the security team/SoC
>> would retrieve the master key from their password store then use it to
>> setup the password server.
>>
>> The two models are security equivalent: if memory on the password server
>> is compromised in either your example or in the situation of storing a
>> simple master key, the consequences are the same.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>

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