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Date: Fri, 4 Apr 2014 16:37:43 -0400
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Gambit review

On Fri, Apr 4, 2014 at 3:36 PM, Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@...il.com> wrote:
>
>
> Bill Cox (at Friday, April 4, 2014, 12:55:41 PM):
>
>> Overall, its a nice little Catena inspired PHS.
>
> thanks for taking the time to write some analysis about gambit. a
> remark to the above quote: i advertised this method as early as
> 2013-aug-11:
>
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.phc/221

No problem.  I'm enjoying reading everyone's code.  Sorry about being
a jerk sometimes.

> catena is 23 Aug 2013:
>
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/525
>
>
> as a fun fact: in an even earlier version, i used bit reversal
> indexing. but i changed it to the current approach, which is simpler.

It is simpler.  Did you use bit reversal before reading Catena?  I
thought it was novel when I read it, but I'm new to this stuff.  In
reality, I don't think it makes a huge difference either way.  If you
like, I could add your memory pattern to my pebbling algorithm to see
how it does.  I am still trying to figure out what the impact is of
XORing over memory rather than overwriting it.  Some others did a lot
of XORing (including me), leaving themselves open to some attacks, but
since you only write the output of SHA3, I don't see how XORing can
hurt you.  In recomputations, it may give me some options for deriving
the value of a node based on the nodes it drives, which will be
difficult to add to my pebbling code.  It also increases the input
degree, meaning I may have to do more recomputations.  Evaluating it
carefully would be tricky.

I see two mistakes I made above (I was very sleepy): I was multiplying
speedup from faster memory access times how much faster SHA3 would run
in an FPGA or ASIC; and I was over-estimating RAM bandwidth in ASICs
and FPGAs for predictable addressing.  One or the other limits how
fast it can run, not the multiplication of both.  Also, I checked some
memory access speeds, and the best case I can see doing in an ASIC
today is about 0.2 PiB/s (16MiB of cache built out of parallel 16KiB
caches, with 512 bit outputs), and more realistically 0.1 PiB/s.  That
ratio to our cache speed is the potential memory speedup factor.

I still think there is maybe a 100X to 1000X potential cache access
speedup in an ASIC for predictable addressing, but for Blake2b, I'm
guessing only on the order of 30X speedup is possible in an advanced
ASIC.  I've heard SHA3 will be more than 100X.  In either case, it's
probably computation speed limited on the ASIC.

Now that I've seen a couple entries that use the new AESENC
instruction, I'm more of a fan.  It has a 2 cycle latency, and the CPU
can queue a sick number of them per core, like 8.  I suspect we would
have trouble speeding it up more than 2X on a custom ASIC.  I tried
estimating how far I could get with an FPGA attack on EARWORM, and the
FPGA just can't do AES any faster than an Intel CPU, even with all
it's parallelism - at least not enough faster to make it worthwhile.

Bill

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