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Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 08:47:43 -0400
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Dumb fast file digest idea...

On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 4:30 AM, Dmitry Khovratovich <khovratovich@...il.com
> wrote:

> Bill,
>
> this is not the way the things are done in symmetric crypto. As you see,
> one can invent hundreds of hash functions per day, many of them being very
> fast and seemingly secure.
>

True, but I'm actually more interested in the approach rather than the hash
function.  The basic approach is having 2 or more independent low-round
hashes of the same data, computed with different orders.  Does combining
them increase security?  If so, what are the best orders, etc.  This is one
level up from the cryptographic hash primitive.

Sorry about spamming the idea here.  I get dumb ideas all the time, and
they just die because I do not have time to pursue them.  At least this
way, I know I've planted the idea where it counts - in the minds of the
crypto guys who do this stuff full time.


> However, the cryptanalysis resources are limited, so the entire community
> can properly study only a handful of functions per year. Hence it's
> designer's job to select one (rarely two) of many possible alternatives,
> study it himself, publish the analysis and motivation (10+ pages usually),
> implement it and only then invite the others to look at the design.
>

It just about killed me writing TwoCats and doing my day job at the same
time.  I think it is possible that I could become the right guy to write
such a hash function, but doing it right requires more time than I have.  I
really appreciate the time you've spent looking at this while it's still in
the dumb idea stage, but I don't expect to carry this forward with any
significant effort.

In your particular example, before anyone starts analysing it, you should
> have answered the following questions publicly and convincingly:
> 1) why two states (not one, not three?)?
> 2) why and which rand_const (why one constant? why here constant? any
> constant?)
> 3) why 127-i? (not 2i, not 3i, not pi*i)
> 4) why inverse_round?
> 5) why low and high (why not xor the two, why not only low, why not only
> high)?
>

This is why crypto is so fun.  You can do this kind of stuff all day long.
 I thought of three stages.  If two is secure, clearly it's faster, that's
why not three.

Actually, I switched to initializing the two Blake2b states the way Lyra2
does it, and then hacked one of the states by XORing adjacent state values.
 This was just to insure they start with different states.  I could have
complemented it or whatever.  I don't think it matters.

Actually, I lowered it to 64 from 128.  This is chosen to fit one
"super-block" into L1 cache, and for no other reason.  64 makes it 16KiB.

I did the second state with inverse-rounds, from the other end, because it
becomes the decryption algorithm while the other does encryption, where the
message is the key.  I thought that was cool :-)  A simple attack on this
system is to muck with the last block so that the encrypted value of state1
becomes the initial value of state2.  This will cause the decryption of
state2 to become state1.  I just check for that in the code and tweak the
initial values of both of them if this happens.

Low and high was just to combine the states fully.  Blake2b just XORs the
two, so that would likely be just fine.  However, in the code I wrote
yesterday, I do the more dangerous thing, and XOR 1024 bits of input at a
time onto the state, giving an attacker 100% control over the internal
state of one of the states.  I'd rather start with that and see why it's
not secure than back off, hoping it's secure, and not understanding why or
why not.  It's the same thing with 2 vs three states and hashing tracks.


> Similar questions apply to most of the PHC submissions, in fact.
>
> Best regards,
> Dmitry
>

Which is why it's possible to spend a year designing such a beast.  I still
can't decide if I like my full TwoCats algorithm better than my stripped
down SkinnyCat.  TwoCats addresses most of the weaknesses Alexander finds
in most minimal memory-hard hashing algorithms.  SkinnyCat says "I don't
care!" and leaves all the weaknesses in place, while making it far more
likely that implementations will be correct.  There are so many dimensions
to this problem, a person could easily spend his whole life working on it.

Bill

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