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Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 17:48:00 -0400
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Dumb fast file digest idea...

On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 4:30 AM, Dmitry Khovratovich <khovratovich@...il.com
> wrote:

> Bill,
>
> this is not the way the things are done in symmetric crypto. As you see,
> one can invent hundreds of hash functions per day, many of them being very
> fast and seemingly secure. However, the cryptanalysis resources are
> limited, so the entire community can properly study only a handful of
> functions per year. Hence it's designer's job to select one (rarely two) of
> many possible alternatives, study it himself, publish the analysis and
> motivation (10+ pages usually), implement it and only then invite the
> others to look at the design.
>

You convinced me to try harder and prove something before posting the next
version.  I already defeated my scheme with the encryption/decryption thing
above.  I defeated the next three versions I came up with as well, but
finally came up with one I believe I have proven works.  Here's how to do
it:

Given a "secure" one-way hash function built with multiple rounds, and one
more special ability, called for now "chosen message secure", a fast secure
hash function can be built using only an average of two round calls per
message block, regardless of the number of rounds required by the original
hash function for security.

Let R(S) -> S' be a round function which is a permutation.  Let M be the
input message composed of block-sized values: M = m1, m2, ... mN.  Define
H(M, S):

    H(M, S) = R( ... R(R(R(state ^ m1) ^ m2) ^ m3) ... ^ mN)

H is "chosen message secure" iff H is "secure" for every value of M.  H(M,
S) is "secure" for a given value of M if no input collisions can be found,
and if H acts like a random permutation of S.  An input collision happens
when, for a given M, we find two different states S1 and S2 such that H(M,
S1) == H(M, S2).

Given R, a secure one-way hash function can be built using this
"hashSuperBlock" function, using a "super block" of at least N^2 blocks in
size.  It calls R only twice per block of message data:

hashSuperBlock(M, S) {
    S1 = S
    S2 = secureHash1(S) // A known cryptographically string hash of 1 input
    for(i = 0; i < BLOCKLEN; i++) {
        S1 = R(S1) ^ M[i]
        S2 = R(S2) ^ M[reverse(i, blocklen)]
    }
    return secureHash2(S1, S2) // A known cryptographically strong hash of
2 inputs
}

The "reverse" function is the bit-reversal function.  BLOCKLEN should be a
power of 2 and >= N*N.

Theorem: hashSuperBlock is secure, with no message input collisions
attackers can find.

Proof:

Suppose we wish to find an input collision between messages by specially
crafting two input messages, M1 and M2.  Call

the sequential track T1, and the bit-reversal track T2.  Consider the last
message blocks of M1 and M2.  To make S1' the

same for M1 and M2, we need:

    ml1 ^ ml2 = S1_1 ^ S1_2

Where S1_1 is the second to last state of S1 when hashing M1, and S1_2 is
for M2.  For S2' to be the same for M1 and M2:

    ml1 ^ ml2 = S2_1 ^ S2_2

This implies:

    S1_1 ^ S1_2 == S2_1 ^ S2_2

This property must be engineered before the last message block.  However,
any change made to a prior message in the last

N message blocks on T1 will be more than N back on T2, unpredictably
scrambling S2, making it impossible to guess values that achieve this
condition.  Therefore, it is not possible for an attacker to choose the
last N messages to achieve this condition.  Any messages he changes more
than N back are too far to enable the attacker to engineer anything.
 Therefore, the only hope for the attacker is to have the last N message
blocks of M1 and M2 be the same, and to engineer a change before the last N
message blocks which cancel each other out.  However, for two message
changes to influence each other in any useful manner, they must be less
than N appart, meaning the changes will be more than N apart on the other
track, and once again, it becomes impossible for him to engineer both
tracks changes cancelling each other at the same time.

I think that may actually be a real proof.  It's an evil little algorithm
:-)  I can't say it's secure until guys who do this all the time agree that
it is secure.

Now I'll go code it, starting with Lyra2's Blake2 code.  The performance
should be close to what I posted yesterday, though I will need to write a
fast bit-reversal function, possibly using a lookup table.

Bill

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