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Message-ID: <CAOLP8p4qrGaEodDSiWH2prcV=EiJVbqQYYe+U45Afgc8H3w11w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 11:43:10 -0400
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] What Microsoft Would like from the PHC - Passwords14 presentation
On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 3:45 AM, Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@...il.com>
wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 12:58 AM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com> wrote:
>
> > It obviously has the same cache timing resistance characteristics as the
> other hybrid designs, which are labelled with "maybe" rather than "no".
>
>
> there is no such thing as sorta cache timing resistant. it either is
> or isn't. if it isn't, we can talk about how hard to exploit.
>
OK, then all the hybrid designs are *not* cache timing resistant. However,
they all happen to be better at *defending the password* than any of the
cache-timing resistant algorithms, even when the attacker has cache-timing
data. What should we call algorithms that provide better cache-timing
password defense than cache-timing resistant algorithms?
Bill
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