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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.11.1408221946190.659@debian>
Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 19:50:17 +0200 (CEST)
From: Stefan.Lucks@...-weimar.de
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] What Microsoft Would like from the PHC - Passwords14
presentation
On Fri, 22 Aug 2014, Bill Cox wrote:
> OK, then all the hybrid designs are *not* cache timing resistant.
> However, they all happen to be better at *defending the password* than
> any of the cache-timing resistant algorithms, even when the attacker has
> cache-timing data.
Do they?
The very least the adversary can see from the hybrid designs is if the
password is the same (same data access pattern) or has been changed
(completely different data access pattern). This doesn't immediately help
to find the password, but it can still be useful information ...
Stefan
------ I love the taste of Cryptanalysis in the morning! ------
<http://www.uni-weimar.de/cms/medien/mediensicherheit/home.html>
--Stefan.Lucks (at) uni-weimar.de, Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, Germany--
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