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Message-ID: <CA+hr98EsVhbtEeqjXDZuQ28Qm5cD0M_tUS7pP7wY9FDUgt=2ZA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2014 18:05:38 +0200
From: Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@...il.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] What Microsoft Would like from the PHC - Passwords14 presentation
On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 5:43 PM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com> wrote:
> OK, then all the hybrid designs are *not* cache timing resistant. However,
> they all happen to be better at *defending the password* than any of the
> cache-timing resistant algorithms, even when the attacker has cache-timing
> data.
we've been through this, and you are wrong. cache timing attack might
reveal data that otherwise would not be accessible. it is not about
breaking the resource-requirement. to do cache timing or other timing,
you don't even need the password hash, you might infer the password
solely from timing information. that is a serious breach. i'm kind of
embarrassed that we need to discuss that in the 21st century. all new
designs are cache timing resistant (or ~ enabled), let it be keccak,
salsa, curve25519, etc. i'm very frustrated by this topic.
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