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Date: Wed, 03 Sep 2014 14:32:17 -0700
From: Alex Elsayed <eternaleye@...il.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: Re: Second factor (was A review per day - Schvrch)

Andy Lutomirski wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 3, 2014 at 12:31 PM, Alex Elsayed
> <eternaleye@...il.com> wrote:
>> Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>>> On Sep 3, 2014 3:44 AM, "Bill Cox"
>>> <waywardgeek@...hershed.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>>>> Hash: SHA1
>>>>
>>>> On 09/03/2014 02:41 AM, Krisztián Pintér wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> > Bill Cox (at Wednesday, September 3, 2014, 3:33:27 AM):
>>>> >
>>>> >> Is this why you included a ROM in Gambit?
>>>> >
>>>> > no, i wanted a second factor in the auth scheme, namely the "have",
>>>> > and i wanted it to be relatively hard to steal. not that i achieved
>>>> > this goal, because stealing a ~100MB file is not particularly
>>>> > difficult these days. not much more difficult than stealing a 32
>>>> > byte file.
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> Second factor is something that I think a lot of entries with a secret
>>>> key or local parameter or data field.  I don't think it has to be
>>>> integrated in the memory hashing part unless we're trying to build a
>>>> Yescrypt or EARWORM style authentication server, though it is best if
>>>> the user isn't expected to hash the ROM himself.  TrueCrypt has a
>>>> minor weakness in that they use CRC32 hashes for key files rather than
>>>> a real hash, enabling files to be tweaked such that they don't impact
>>>> the hash result.
>>>>
>>>> There is a second factor hack for TrueCrypt using a bootable USB
>>>> stick.  The cool part is you no longer need a master boot record or
>>>> volume header on the encrypted hard-disk, which is basically a little
>>>> header saying, "I am a TrueCrypt Drive and here are the salt and
>>>> password hash you need to brute-force attack me.  I'm bending over for
>>>> you."
>>>>
>>>> The hard part about second factor is protecting it, IMO.  I have a
>>>> GnuPG smartcard now in my pocket, which may mean that my secret
>>>> signing key is harder to steal than before.  Without such a device,
>>>> how can users keep any random infected machine they plug it into from
>>>> hacking them?
>>>>
>>>> Even with such a device, how can I know that malware isn't signing
>>>> random things left and right while I have it plugged in?  It could
>>>> locate my encrypted BitCoin wallet, and just sit there for years
>>>> waiting for me to plug in my USB key.
>>>>
>>>> A dumb problem with existing second factor schemes where you have a
>>>> security token is that they seem to simply share a secret with the
>>>> server.  I see popular security companies like Forticlient have lame
>>>> processes going on at the protocol level, meaning if the client
>>>> doesn't see it, they feel no need to make it very secure.  For second
>>>> factor, they first tell you your token guess is wrong before asking
>>>> for the password, and they do nothing to protect a password once it's
>>>> typed in.  My point is we *can't* trust these closed-source companies
>>>> to protect the shared secret in a way that makes it hard for an
>>>> attacker to gain both the password and security token databases.
>>>>
>>>> In other words, the security token you get from work may be quite lame
>>>> as defense against brute-force offline attacks.
>>>>
>>>> Getting second factor right is hard!  Anyone have any really good
>>>> non-patented ideas?
>>>
>>> [mostly off topic]
>>>
>>> Yes, sort of, I think.
>>>
>>> Ideally, I want a security token with a few properties:
>>>
>>> a) Use of the token is protected by a passphrase.
>>>
>>> b) The token can't tell whether a given passphrase is correct or not.
>>>
>>> c) If the token is honest, then no one can test a candidate passphrase
>>> without querying the token once per passphrase tested.
>>>
>>> d) If the token is stolen but the computer it's in remains
>>> uncompromised, then the token is completely useless to an attacker.
>>>
>>> A naive ECC-based protocol that attempts to have these properties
>>> works like this:
>>>
>>> Choose a secure elliptic curve E with order r.  Choose an encryption
>>> function E_k which acts like an ideal cipher mod r (there are standard
>>> constructions for these things, although modular addition or possibly
>>> multiplication might actually be good enough for this use case).
>>>
>>> The token has a secret symmetric key K_master.  An actual client
>>> credential is a scalar S = S_c + S_t.  S_c is the computer's share of
>>> the scalar and S_t is the token's share.  A server's verifier for a
>>> client credential is g^S.
>>>
>>> The token stores none of the credential at all.  The client user knows
>>> a passphrase.  The client's computer stores a salt, and it can compute
>>> derive kc and kt by some suitable algorithm (presumably using a PHC
>>> winner!) on the passphrase and the salt.  The client stores E_kc(S_c)
>>> and E_kt(E_K_master(S_t)).
>>>
>>> The token is willing to take some input mod r, decrypt it using
>>> K_master, and multiple an EC point by the result.  When the client uer
>>> enters a passphrase, the computer can obtain S_c and E_K_master(S_t)
>>> and use the token along with its knowledge of S_c to multiply things
>>> by S.  It uses this to participate in a zero-knowledge proof of
>>> knowledge with the server to prove knowledge of S such that g^S
>>> matches the verifier.
>>>
>>> Why is this good?
>>>
>>> The token doesn't store any credential at all, so stealing it by
>>> itself is mostly worthless (U2F is like this, too, as is a TPM,
>>> although stealing a TPM without also stealing the computer it's in
>>> would be a rather strange attack).
>>>
>>> The client computer and the token, even colluding, can't test a
>>> passphrase without knowing the verifier.  As far as they're concerned,
>>> any trial passphrase generates some S value, but the correct S is a
>>> uniform random number mod r, so correct and incorrect S values are
>>> indistinguishable.
>>>
>>> If a secure ZK proof is used (see PAKE schemes for examples of how to
>>> do this), the client and token, even colluding, can only test one
>>> passphrase value at a time.
>>>
>>> One tricky thing, though: you'd want to carefully encrypt the client
>>> <-> token communication.  Otherwise someone could potentially sniff it
>>> and learn something that could be used to test passphrases if they
>>> watch the communication during a successful authentication.
>>>
>>> NB: In practice, you'd need to be very careful if you use this in a
>>> protocol with a group of composite order.  I think that the simplest
>>> approach would be to have the token multiply by the cofactor times its
>>> share instead of just multiplying by its share.
>>
>> ...this sounds to me like far more complexity than is needed.
> 
> Probably true.
> 
>>
>> If you have the token act as the server for an augmented PAKE, and the
>> PAKE's "failed authentication" mode is "return different keys to each
>> party", eliding the check step and blindly using the (potentially
>> incorrect) derived key as an input to the password scrambler gives the
>> full benefits.
> 
> I don't quite follow.  Who's the "client" for the PAKE, and what's the
> "password"?

Actually, on second reading I messed up (in a few ways) - I blame a lack of 
caffeine.

However, here's another try:

The user 'U' holds a PIN 'N' and a password 'P'
the token 'T' holds a secret value 'X'

1.) T and U execute a PAKE over N, yielding channel C_t
2.) U sends P over C_t
3.) T combines X and P, yielding Y
4.) A and T execute a PAKE over Y, yielding channel C_a (U relays messages)
5.) T sends its derived key for C_a over C_t
6.) U and A are now authenticated (or not, but 'not' leaks no information)

I suspect the method used to combine X and P is pretty much irrelevant, 
since Y never leaves the token, meaning that the token can get away with 
being nothing more than a PAKE implementation and a tiny amount of storage.

To recap your requirements:
> a) Use of the token is protected by a passphrase.

Yep - without the PIN, the initial secured channel cannot be established.

> b) The token can't tell whether a given passphrase is correct or not.

Yep - it simply composes the user secret and its own secret.

> c) If the token is honest, then no one can test a candidate passphrase
> without querying the token once per passphrase tested.

Yep - because the token executes the PAKE protocol with the auth server,
it can't be cut out of the loop.

> d) If the token is stolen but the computer it's in remains
> uncompromised, then the token is completely useless to an attacker.

Yep - because of the properties of a secure PAKE, nothing that could be used 
to recover X ever leaves the token, and P was never present.

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