phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Design Rationale and Security Analysis of PHC candidates

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Message-ID: <542D4969.60008@ciphershed.org>
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 08:47:37 -0400
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...hershed.org>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Design Rationale and Security Analysis of PHC candidates

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On 10/02/2014 06:50 AM, Dmitry Khovratovich wrote:
> The value "Explored" stands for the case when the designers
> actually try to mount a collision/preimage attack on their design
> and show why it fails

Sorry about my language in my previous post.

The paper, "Design Rationality and Security Analysis of PHC
Candidates: Overview", has very many incorrect statements, and the
table, showing Argon to be as good or better than every other entry in
every aspect considered except complexity, is based on nothing but the
author's incorrect opinion of his work compared to other entries.  No
proof whatsoever of any claim is presented.  It also ignores attacks
made on his entry, including my highly parallel attack that shows
Argon is not in it's current form safe for use.

As just one example, Gambit, which uses Keccak on all input parameters
to properly derive a cryptographically secure initial key, making it a
"strongly secure" entry, is listed as having only "claimed" basic
security.  Compared to Argon, which leaves the password in plain text
in memory for a long time, where it is likely to be written to disk,
Gambit has excellent "Basic cryptography".

I am not sure how to respond to papers like this that look
professional, but are nothing more than a sales pitch, when the
material being sold is highly insecure.  This follows a paper
described by the author as a proper "cryptanalysis", which uses ASICs
that require Unobtainium to build.

Bill
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