phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Design Rationale and Security Analysis of PHC candidates

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Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 14:54:18 +0200
From: Dmitry Khovratovich <khovratovich@...il.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Design Rationale and Security Analysis of PHC candidates

You're right here.

On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@...il.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 1:56 PM, Dmitry Khovratovich
> <khovratovich@...il.com> wrote:
>
> > Assuming random ROM (this is important, collisions are easy if ROM can be
> > partially chosen)
>
> i claim that the content of ROM is irrelevant. you can not generate
> collisions with it, since it can only affect the "rate" part of the
> sponge, and not the "capacity". to my understanding, even if you are
> in complete control of all the sponge input, you still can not find
> collisions (let alone preimages).
>
> this is a primary design principle of mine. i aim to entirely reuse
> the security claims of keccak.
>



-- 
Best regards,
Dmitry Khovratovich

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