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Message-ID: <CAMtf1Hso4Ymr5zGiEvDYaR4WzpndyU-18FNny5XwoFDCSCmOzA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 09:10:16 +0800
From: Ben Harris <ben@...rr.is>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] How important is salting really?
"Dictionaries and candidate generation algorithms" are the main attacks
precisely because we use salts. If nobody used salts the prevalent attack
would still be rainbow tables.
On 12 December 2014 at 08:58, Bitweasil . <bitweasil@...ptohaze.com> wrote:
> A factor of N slowdown in cracking, where N is the number of unique salts
> in the uncracked list of hashes.
> On Dec 11, 2014 4:57 PM, "Marsh Ray" <maray@...rosoft.com> wrote:
>
>> Password security researchers learn more and more from data breaches
>> seemingly every week. Dictionaries and candidate generation algorithms get
>> better all the time. So here’s a question. Maybe the answer has changed
>> over the last few years and we should revisit our assumptions.
>>
>>
>>
>> Two different people independently choose this same password. It could be
>> “ilovecats” or it could be something less obvious.
>>
>>
>>
>> What is the probability that this password will not be in attackers’
>> dictionaries or it will be hard to crack?
>>
>>
>>
>> (If this chance is small, then what do we gain by salting?)
>>
>>
>>
>> - Marsh
>>
>>
>>
>
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