phc-discussions - RE: [PHC] Some KDF stumbling blocks, plus Common "memory-hard"approaches and amortized attack costs.

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Message-ID: <BY2PR03MB5546D00834C9C82DB7543A1A76F0@BY2PR03MB554.namprd03.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 20:13:53 +0000
From: Marsh Ray <maray@...rosoft.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: RE: [PHC] Some KDF stumbling blocks, plus Common
 "memory-hard"approaches and amortized attack costs.

From: Dimitri Fousekis [mailto:dimitri@...space.co.za] 
> Is there an adversary classification that has been designed?
> Taking into account what the adversary may or may not
> have access to and specifically the budget and thus
> computational power they may have?

And whether the adversary's goal is to crack:
A. Just one password for any account 
B. The password for one specific account
C. One password out of a specific group (say admins)
D. As many as practical. E.g., for resale or for a customer pentest report.
E. All passwords. E.g., password researchers or enthusiasts with bored GPUs :-)

- Marsh