phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Some KDF stumbling blocks, plus Common "memory-hard" approaches and amortized attack costs.

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Message-ID: <CAMtf1HstQnzGWYGfZbPB4QU9C-DG+B2dfahQ6T_3SgCG3nU18g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 20:26:40 +0800
From: Ben Harris <ben@...rr.is>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Some KDF stumbling blocks, plus Common "memory-hard"
 approaches and amortized attack costs.

On 16 December 2014 at 15:01, Christian Forler <
christian.forler@...-weimar.de> wrote:

> A password that is protected by a 256-bit key should
> withstand even state level attackers (e.g., NSA).
>

Back of the envelope calcs suggests that 128-bit should be more than
sufficient.
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/05/25/strengthmatching.html

BTW. At page 24, of our current Catena specification [1] we proposed a
> keyed password hashing approach that thwarts off-line attacks.
>

Page 25 I think?
Nice how it keeps the client-independent update property.

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