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Message-ID: <CAOLP8p5V=m--XjXkxeNouKGupByFEKJpD+QeppdgTSoYpt0BHw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 11:29:09 -0700
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>, 
	"cryptography@...zdowd.com" <cryptography@...zdowd.com>
Subject: [OT] Improvement to Momentum PoW

A problem with Momentum as currently implemented is that it can be run with
reduced memory, enabling efficient GPU attacks
<http://da-data.blogspot.com/2014/01/gaining-momentum-duplicate-detection-in.html>.
I think we can get around this problem simply by changing the parameters it
uses.  Here's what Momentum computes:

for i, j in [0 .. 2^n-1]:
    if Hb(i) == Hb[j] and H(i || j) < threshold:
        report i, j

In this case, Hb is specific to a block-chain digest and nonce, as is H.
In the current implementations, n is 2^26 and the size of Hb's output is 50
bits.  H's output is far larger, either 256 or 512 bits.  This leads to on
average something like 3-ish collisions per nonce tried.

If instead, we run with n == 26, and Hb's output also being 26 bits, then
we get around 2^26 collisions.  Each needs to be tested to see if H(i || j)
< threshold.  The obvious algorithm is to do this rapidly is:

Initialize array M to 2^26 empty lists.
for i in [0 .. 2^n-1]:
    list = M[Hb(i)]
    for j in list:
        # i collides with j
        if H(i || j) < threshold:
            report i, j
        if H(j || i) < threshold:
            report j, i
    list.append(i)

This seems to defeat Bloom filters and similar memory reduction
techniques.  While a parallel Pollard Rho algorithm would work, it's slow
and reduces memory no more than the simple TMTO attack where we only store
some small range of Hb(i) in the hash table to reduce it's size.

I am not sure why this approach is not used in current implementations.  Is
there some attack I'm not seeing?

While this slight modification might enable Momentum to resist GPU attacks,
it's runtime is still dominated by Hb and H calculations, which an ASIC
will speed up dramatically.  I get around that by generating 32
non-cryptographic hash values for each cryptographic hash generated,
getting a speed-up of over 16X.  However, modern Intel CPUs seem to be very
weak at running buffered radix-sort.  An ASIC will run at full memory
bandwidth, which might be far higher than a typical CPU's bandwidth.  For
example, I can fill 1 GiB with unsorted birthday hashes in 0.2 seconds on
my machine.  When I create 256 buffers of 4KiB each, and do a byte-based
radix-sort pass, this delay jumps up to about 0.65 seconds.  This is with
temporal streaming writes, so I'm not polluting L2 or L3 cache with my
buffer writes.  An ASIC would see no such additional delay, and would
likely have significantly higher bandwidth to memory as well.

I'm think that ASICs will still win significantly vs CPUs on every
implementation I've seen of Momentum.  The enhancements above should, if
I'm not mistaken, at least stop GPUs.

Bill

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