Message-ID: <CALiR+uPVupbYsVyd0efSy12n3oyOqgLKj3xrNJUHbuAG3MHPRw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2015 06:57:39 +0000
From: Sascha Schmidt <sascha@...midt.is>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] An API for Efficiently Obtaining t_cost

Hi.
I'm not sure if the API you suggested shouldn't be simplified. In the end a
search function mostly caters to developers that are unfamiliar with
password hashing. Anyone else could easily do the search on their own.
While the input and salt may slightly change the runtime for schemes with a
data-dependent memory-access pattern, no one is going to search for the
optimal parameters for every password. Exposing in, out and salt could give
the false impression that they are relevant for the search process or may
even lead to developers using their own passwords for testing.

Sincerely
Sascha Schmidt

P.S.: We have implemented such a search application for Catena:
https://github.com/medsec/catena-axungia
It searches under supplied constraints for time, memory and memory-hardness.



On Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 2:08 AM Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com> wrote:

> Some entries (I think including Yescrypt and TwoCats) do something
> similar, and provide estimated parameters to meet your time goal.  These
> tools take a max_memory and target_time parameters.  The more typical case
> is that we cannot fill as much memory as you would like for a given target
> time. so t_cost is set to the minimum value, and an m_cost parameter is
> suggested to target the desired runtime.  In rare cases, you want to fill
> memory and keep rehashing, in which case m_cost is set to max_mem and
> t_cost is adjusted accordingly.
>
> I have yet to see an actual deployment making use of more than the minimum
> t_cost parameter in any application, so I'm not a fan of that parameter,
> but it's there, and both m_cost and t_cost should be suggested for Argon2.
> I suspect their team already has something like this in the works.  They
> are welcome to look at my code in twocats-common.c to see what I did.
>
>
> Bill
>
> On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 1:52 PM, Taylor Hornby <taylor@....io> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> I'm not sure if it's the PHC's job to standardize on an API for the
>> winning hash function, but I'm going to strongly argue that
>> implementations MUST to provide an API similar to the following:
>>
>> int PHS_find_t_cost(
>>         void *out,                 /* same */
>>         size_t outlen,             /* same */
>>         const void *in,            /* same */
>>         size_t inlen,              /* same */
>>         const void *salt,          /* same */
>>         size_t saltlen,            /* same */
>>         unsigned int target_msec,  /* target milliseconds */
>>         unsigned int *t_cost,      /* output parameter */
>>         unsigned int m_cost        /* same */
>> );
>>
>> Calling this API should *efficiently* find the best t_cost for the
>> given m_cost and target running time, on the current system under its
>> current workload, while at the same time computing a hash. In other
>> words, for a fixed m_cost, it should find the smallest valid t_cost
>> such that the time taken is longer than target_msec milliseconds.
>>
>> The problem is that on memory-constrained devices, you might want to
>> use as much memory you can, and then keep computing on that memory for
>> a certain amount of time, say 5 seconds, when you don't know which
>> t_cost to use for that amount of time, and you don't want to do trial-
>> and-error or extrapolation from faster calls.
>>
>> I think this is an extremely important API to mandate, since if the
>> developer needs it, and it isn't provided for them, they either have to
>> do trial-and-error or heuristically guess-then-check t_cost which is
>> not efficient, OR they have to modify or even re-implement the
>> password-hashing library, likely losing important optimizations and
>> thus giving the attacker an advantage in the process.
>>
>> It will also result higher t_cost being chosen in practice. Developers
>> can hard-code the time cost in units of seconds, so that t_cost is
>> always as high as it can be without impacting usability. Without this
>> API, they'd have to run benchmarks on the system to select t_cost, or
>> hard-code non-optimal costs, like the libsodium API [1,2,3] does.
>>
>> It's possible to efficiently provide this API for the iteration count
>> in PBKDF2 as well as for 'p' in scrypt. I think it is also possible for
>> Argon2.
>>
>> Even if we decide not to require this API, please consider adding it to
>> your implementations.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> -Taylor
>>
>> [1] http://doc.libsodium.org/password_hashing/index.html
>> [2] https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium/blob/e326ef90301cf570a5e6691c
>> 46d4a1d37adc1e07/src/libsodium/include/sodium/crypto_pwhash_scryptsalsa
>> 208sha256.h#L28
>> <https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium/blob/e326ef90301cf570a5e6691c%0D46d4a1d37adc1e07/src/libsodium/include/sodium/crypto_pwhash_scryptsalsa%0D208sha256.h#L28>
>> [3] https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium/blob/e326ef90301cf570a5e6691c
>> 46d4a1d37adc1e07/src/libsodium/crypto_pwhash/scryptsalsa208sha256/pwhas
>> h_scryptsalsa208sha256.c#L18
>> <https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium/blob/e326ef90301cf570a5e6691c%0D46d4a1d37adc1e07/src/libsodium/crypto_pwhash/scryptsalsa208sha256/pwhas%0Dh_scryptsalsa208sha256.c#L18>
>>
>> p.s. Apologies if this has been discussed before. There's a lot on this
>> list I haven't read.
>>
>
>

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