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Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 10:31:22 +0100 (CET) From: Stefan.Lucks@...weimar.de To: discussions@...swordhashing.net Subject: Re: [PHC] How to: A superefficient cryptographic accumulator? Hey Denis, you have a nice idea, but it won't work for informationtheoretical reasons. I'll explain below. > [...] the best measure for password safety is probably to prevent users > from using any of billions of known revealed passwords, but the > compressed database is 5 GB in size: > > https://github.com/berzerk0/ProbableWordlists/blob/master/Downloads.md Let us denote this list of bad passwords as "L", and the universe of passwords not in L (up to a fixed length) as "U". > Now. I sort of have this intuition that it’s possible to compress this crap > into 20 bytes. That's not a typo – 20 bytes, not megabytes or something. > But I don’t know how. > > If we have an infinitely fast computer, then we can simply find X such > that: > > TruncateTo32Bits ( SHA256 ( X  P1 ) ) == 0x00000000 > TruncateTo32Bits ( SHA256 ( X  P2 ) ) == 0x00000000 > TruncateTo32Bits ( SHA256 ( X  anything else ) ) == whatever What you mean is (1) Trunc32 ( SHA256 ( X  P ) ) == 0x00000000 for all P in L and ideally (2) Trunc32 ( SHA256 ( X  Q ) ) != 0x00000000 for all Q in U or, for a (2') Pr [Trunc32 ( SHA256 ( X  Q ) ) == 0x00000000] < 0.01 for Q in U chosen at random > If we crank the infinitely fast computer long enough, we should be able to > find this X, If we consider SHA256 as a "random oracle", such an X exists, and, assuming an unlimited amount of computer power, we can find it. > and it should be small in size. Why do you think it would be small in size? That is the whole point: X will be HUGE! If we want to meet both (1) and (2), then we can statistically expect X to be as big as L. The reason is simple: Whenever we change L, we need another X. Changing from (2) to (2') doesn't safe the day: X can be slightly smaller, but only by a few bits. > The only reason we should not be able to find this X is if SHA256 has > some structural issue that prohibits an X like that from existing. Yes, the iterated structure of SHA256 (and essentially all other hash functions ever published) makes the existence of X extremely unlikely. Neither SHA512 nor SHA3 will do, nor Blake, JH, Groestl, Skein, ... BTW, if X where actually small in size, the iterated structure would not pose a problem, and even SHA256 would do. > In that case we use a better hash function. Good luck with designing an entirely new type of cryptographic hash function! > Now, the reason we can’t do that is, the way SHA256 is designed, it > requires us to have an infinitely fast computer. There are three obstacles to doing that: 1. The way SHA256 and essentially all other hash functions are designed, such an X is unlikely to exist. 2. Given an ideal hash function (a "random oracle") X should exist, but we would need an absurdly fast computer to find X. 3. Given an ideal hash function and an absurdly fast computer, X would still be about as large as L. So even then, there is not much of an advantage over using L directly. Finally, you asked about a quantum computer. If s is the expected size of X (in bits), the search for X will take about 2^(2^s) steps on a classical computer. Using a quantum computer, we can apply Grover's algorithm to reduce this value to its squareroot: 2^((2^s)1). If L is a few Gigabytes, then s is 30 or larger. Even using a quantum computer, the sun will long be cold before your quantum computer can output X. Stefan  I love the taste of Cryptanalysis in the morning!  www.uniweimar.de/de/medien/professuren/mediensicherheit/people/stefanlucks Stefan.Lucks (at) uniweimar.de, BauhausUniversität Weimar, Germany
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