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Date: Sat Jun 10 01:45:17 2006
From: bill.stout at greenborder.com (Bill Stout)
Subject: Want to test this desktop barrier?,
	(Unauthorized offer) 0day protection

Hi Dan,

There's a couple of ways it differs.  

1. Programs running in DROPMYRIGHTS and RunAs can still access files and
directories to which 'everyone' has access.  It's not common for someone
to check rights of every single directory in a computer to check who has
access to what.  A virtualized environment controls what directories the
environment has access to, to prevent dropping files in unwanted areas,
and to prevent reading confidential data from files.  For example;
MS-Word launched in the virtualized space to open a download shouldn't
be able to open files in 'My Documents'.

2. DROPMYRIGHTS and RunAs exclude membership of the lowered user from
known privileged user groups, but not custom privileged user groups.
For example; you may have created a new group for backup (backup_exec),
and since that new group is not a known privileged group, membership of
the lowered user of that group is ignored.  See tables in:
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/dncode/
html/secure11152004.asp 

3. Changing the access permissions of a program to certain resources
often causes the program to crash.  It's a problem if the only
permissions available are read/write/modify/delete/enumerate, and it's
undesirable to write or modify a value, and a program has to write or
modify a value to run.  For usability reasons, effectively having a
'virtualize' permission is useful.  This way only a copy of the value or
a temporary value is changed, which permits the program to run without
crashingin a controlled environment.  This virtualization can be done
for filesystem and registry, but also system calls and COM can be
virtualized (spoofed) to the virtual environment.  

HTH

Bill Stout


-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk
[mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of Dan
Renner
Sent: Thursday, June 08, 2006 10:33 AM
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Want to test this desktop
barrier?,(Unauthorized offer) 0day protection

This is definitely has more luxury features, but couldn't you do pretty 
much the same with MSDN's DROPMYRIGHTS program?

It runs {whatever} program as a guest user, effectively dropping the 
capabilities of that program to do nefarious things.

----------------------------------

Sincerely,

Dan Renner
President
Los Angeles Computerhelp
http://losangelescomputerhelp.com
818.352.8700



full-disclosure-request@...ts.grok.org.uk wrote:

> Message: 9
>
>Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2006 10:14:21 -0700
>From: "Bill Stout" <bill.stout@...enborder.com>
>Subject: [Full-disclosure] Want to test this desktop barrier?
>	(Unauthorized	offer) 0day protection
>To: <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
>Message-ID:
>	<1FA45C2E5F2E4B46967415DA3A804FE83C3A1C@...l.greenborder.com>
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
>Hello All,
>
>We have an early release of consumer desktop safety software that I'd
>like some feedback on. 
>
>http://www.greenborder.com/earlyaccess/ 
>
>Our software runs on XP SP2, and creates an application-level virtual
>environment primarily (for now) for Internet Explorer.  This prevents
>modification of the base system by any content in the virtual
>environment.  We refer to the virtual environment as 'x-space', or
>'within GreenBorder'.  We apply access control from the virtual
>environment to; the filesystem, registry, user shell, COM objects, and
>system calls.
>
>Although only Internet Explorer and applications which open downloaded
>attachments are supported, other applications can be launched in the
>GreenBorder environment.  Any processes running or temporary files or
>temporary registry entries are wiped from the virtual environment by an
>application reset.  Files can be saved to a specific directory only,
and
>applications in this environment are prevented from reading files
>outside this one directory (applies confidentiality).
>
>We don't determine what application running in the virtual environment
>is malicious or not, so therefore this is not a replacement for
>signature based protection systems.  Most anything can run in the
>environment, it just can't modify local resources.  This is great
>protection for 0-day exploits, and lets administrators wait to apply
>patches off-hours.
>
>Hammer on our software by running malware of your choice in the
software
>environment.  Please email me or the marketing email of your results.
>If you're running intensive tests, I would still recommend using a
>scratch system.
>
>We also have an enterprise version which uses a central whitelist to
>determine in which environment to open a site requested or Outlook
>message received.
>
>Bill Stout
>www.greenborder.com
>
>
>Appended below is our marketing spiel:
>
>
>
>"We are very pleased to give you special, early access to GreenBorder
>Pro, the new consumer edition of our patented enterprise technology
>(that's already protecting thousands of users in some of the most
>demanding environments).
> 
>With GreenBorder Pro, NOTHING CAN BREAK INTO YOUR PC from the Web.  You
>can:
>  *  Search & browse ANY website-without putting your PC, files or
>private
>     identity data at risk (or leaving any trace on your PC of where
you
>have been :)
>  *  Shop & bank in privacy-without anything spying on your personal
>info,
>     bank account and credit card numbers, passwords or online
>transactions
>  *  Use any downloads-without worrying about anything nasty hidden
>inside
>Simply click on the link below to get to the GreenBorder Pro VIP page.
>There, you can see a guided tour, learn about the software, and
download
>your own copy. Here is a special VIP license key to copy & paste when
>you install: 
> 
>34422VS222222222222279429422K44W
>Click here to get GreenBorder Pro
><http://www.greenborder.com/earlyaccess> 
> 
>We would greatly appreciate any comments or suggestions you might have
>along the way. Just email us at vip@...enborder.com or click on the
>GreenBorder icon and select Contact Customer Support in the software
>itself!"
>
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