From: toddtowles at brookshires.com (Todd Towles)
Subject: University Researchers Challenge Bush Win In Florida

Did the charter say something about political messages?..please take it
off the list guys if possible...

> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com 
> [mailto:full-disclosure-admin@...ts.netsys.com] On Behalf Of 
> Paul Schmehl
> Sent: Wednesday, November 24, 2004 11:22 AM
> To: Jason Coombs; Gregory Gilliss; full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com
> Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] University Researchers 
> Challenge Bush Win In Florida
> 
> --On Wednesday, November 24, 2004 05:39:31 AM +0000 Jason 
> Coombs <jasonc@...ence.org> wrote:
> >
> > In the case in point, even with the variables you mention, 
> the entire 
> > technical problem can be reduced to observing how the election 
> > officials in various places have historically constructed 
> ballots and 
> > influence just those that can be influenced in just those 
> states where 
> > it will matter. The Republican party (my party) apparently has 
> > advantages over others when it comes to influencing the technical 
> > details of the design of voting machines. Diebold, for example.
> >
> The horse has already been packed up and shipped from the 
> rendering plant, but I'll give this *one* more try.  (One 
> side note - the management of Diebold are mostly Democrats, 
> not Republicans, not that *that* makes one iota of difference 
> in the competence (or lack thereof) in designing electronic 
> balloting equipment.  Pointing to someone's party affiliation 
> as proof of something is merely a distraction from the real issues.)
> 
> You are talking about an extremely complex and unlikely set 
> of possibilities, *all* of which have to fall into place 
> perfectly for this to happen.  It might be fun as 
> speculation, but the implementation would be nigh until 
> impossible and would take some real genius to pull off.
> >
> > It makes just about as much sense for every regional 
> election office 
> > to do their ballot construction differently as it does for 
> everyone to 
> > create their own home grown crypto.
> >
> And yet it's done all over America.  Imagine that.
> >
> > Your point about differences in ballot construction is also a red 
> > herring to begin with. If you think that there is the same 
> degree of 
> > variability with ballots in electronic voting machines as there is 
> > with legacy ballots, then perhaps you are the one who does not know 
> > how the process really works with the machines in question.
> >
> Why would you assume the ballots all have to be the same just 
> because the same machines are being used to count them?
> 
> Given three candidates for President (and there are usually 
> more than that) there are at least six different ways the 
> ballot could be arranged *even* if the basic design was the same.
> 
> Furthermore, the methodology used by an electronic voting 
> machine is independent of the ballot design, for all intents 
> and purposes.  For example, an optical reader merely senses 
> the dark spots where a vote has been cast.  *Which* candidate 
> that represents is determined by the configuration, which is 
> determined by the construction of the ballot. 
> Having to fit within certain machine-driven parameters does 
> not force the ballot design into one pattern.  The votes 
> could be on the left, in the center, on the right, staggered 
> from left to right, staggered from right to left.  The 
> possibilities are great.
> 
> Yet you want to control *all* of that to "take advantage of 
> statistical anomalies" in the equipment?
> 
> Do we have a mathematician on this list who can calculate the 
> probabilities of this?
> 
> I would contend that it is infinitely more likely that the 
> machines would be either deliberately tampered with or 
> incompetently misconfigured, ending up in statistical 
> anomalies then I would ever consider your scenario possible.
> >
> > You really need to stop making things seem so complicated that the 
> > difficulty of influencing their behavior or outcome 
> couldn't possibly 
> > be surmounted.
> >
> Jason, I'm not making anything complicated.  I'm observing 
> the complication that already exists - the complication that 
> you apparently refuse to acknowledge.
> 
> Paul Schmehl (pauls@...allas.edu)
> Adjunct Information Security Officer
> The University of Texas at Dallas
> AVIEN Founding Member
> http://www.utdallas.edu
> 
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