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Message-ID: <1a9f19350609272237o67ba58b4na394cb713fdf77c6@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2006 11:07:26 +0530
From: "Pukhraj Singh" <pukhraj.singh@...il.com>
To: avivra <avivra@...il.com>
Cc: EArsal@...hdata.de, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk,
bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: VML Exploit vs. AV/IPS/IDS signatures
And you tell me how many of these variants you will actually find in
the wild. Won't be a significant number I bet.
Cheers!
Pukhraj
On 9/27/06, avivra <avivra@...il.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> > i.e. I can't afford to buy "specialized" security tools/devices for
> > "speclialized" attacks unless my company relies heavily on web/content
> > services.
>
> So, you will buy "specialized" security tools like firewall or
> Anti-Virus, but not web content filtering tool?
>
> > In our company, we established a information-sharing
> > network with other security companies. So the real-time exploit-facing
> > signatures were then subjected to live traffic, honeypots and countless
> > variants; They seemed to work out pretty well.
>
> I would like to see how your real-time signatures get updated with the
> randomization implemented in the new VML metasploit module. Your
> "countless" exploit variants will become really innumerable.
>
> The problem is that the signatures are written for the exploit, and
> not for the vulnerability.
>
> -- Aviv.
>
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