linux-kernel - Re: [patch 00/13] vfs: add helpers to check r/o bind mounts

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Message-ID: <20080424181332.GB5882@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Date:	Thu, 24 Apr 2008 19:13:32 +0100
From:	Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
To:	Erez Zadok <ezk@...sunysb.edu>
Cc:	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
	torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, dave@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
	mhalcrow@...ibm.com, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 00/13] vfs: add helpers to check r/o bind mounts

On Thu, Apr 24, 2008 at 01:29:49PM -0400, Erez Zadok wrote:
> In message <20080424142857.GF15214@...IV.linux.org.uk>, Al Viro writes:
> > On Thu, Apr 24, 2008 at 04:09:18PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> [...]
> > FWIW, I'm not all that happy about the way ecryptfs_interpose() is done,
> > while we are at it.  We get the sucker opened by whoever steps on given
> > place in the tree first, with subsequent operations done using the resulting
> > struct file.  With fallback to r/o open.  What happens to somebody who
> > tries to open it with enough permissions to do r/w?
> 
> Yes, ecryptfs_interpose() calls ecryptfs_init_persistent_file() which calls
> dentry_open(O_RDWR).  What's the proposed solution for this in the face of
> r/o vfsmounts?  How could ecryptfs avoid calling this dentry_open in the
> first place?

Doesn't have anything to do with vfsmounts (you have one to deal with and
if it's r/o, it's equivalent to just doing the entire thing on top of r/o
fs; not interesting).

No, what I'm worried about is much simpler.  Look: we have a file on
underlying fs, owned by root.root with 644 for permissions.  Comes a
luser and tries to open the counterpart of that file in ecryptfs; that
triggers ecryptfs_interpose() and attempts to open file.  Of course,
that's going to fail - it's not world-writable.  So then it (actually
ecryptfs_init_persistent_file()) falls back to opening with O_RDONLY.
Which succeeds just fine and file (opened r/o) is set as ->lower_file.

Now comes root and tries to open the damn thing r/w.  It should be able
to and if it came first it'd get it; as it is, what it gets is ->lower_file
and that puppy is opened read-only and you have no guarantee that underlying
fs will not go bonkers seeing write attempts on it (e.g. open for write
doing a bit more setup of ->private_data, etc.).

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