[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20091005105617.5F86.A69D9226@jp.fujitsu.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2009 10:59:02 +0900 (JST)
From: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com>
To: Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@...il.com>
Cc: kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com,
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@...il.com>,
Timo Sirainen <tss@....fi>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Ulrich Drepper <drepper@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Added PR_SET_PROCTITLE_AREA option for prctl()
> On Sun, Oct 4, 2009 at 9:38 PM, KOSAKI Motohiro
> <kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com> wrote:
> >> The improvement idea is here.
> >>
> >> Changelog
> >> - Added task_lock() to prctl(PR_SET_PROCTITLE_AREA)
> >> - Added small input sanity check to prctl(PR_SET_PROCTITLE_AREA)
> >
> > Doh, task_lock() is obviously wrong. please forget this.
>
> As another note, in general I think we'd need to hold a lock over the
> entire operation. After all, if userspace changes its PROCTITLE_AREA,
> and then reuses the memory for something else, we have an information
> leak.
if reusing occur, it's obviously userland fault. I don't think we need to care this.
because current kernel also can be information leak by strcpy(argv[0], mypassword).
I think they are userland bug both.
> Perhaps a simpler approach would simply be to add a generation
> counter. Read it once at the start, barrier, then grab the title. Then
> at the end, read the generation counter again. If the value changed,
> we need to start over. Also, in this case, an error when reading the
> target process' memory should be ignored and retried, as we may have
> hit a race in which the target process unmapped the proctitle area
> after changing it.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists