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Message-ID: <87sj8nzqra.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
Date: Mon, 05 Nov 2012 22:25:29 +0100
From: Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
* James Bottomley:
> Right, but what I'm telling you is that by deciding to allow automatic
> first boot, you're causing the windows attack vector problem. You could
> easily do a present user test only on first boot which would eliminate
> it.
Apparently, the warning will look like this:
WARNING: This Binary is unsigned
Are you sure you wish to run an unsigned binary
in a secure environment?
To avoid this question in future place the platform into setup mode
See http://www.linuxfoundation.org/uefi-setup-mode
And reboot.
I'm not convinced this will work because users will confirm their
presence to get back into the system. We expect GNU/Linux users to do
it, why wouldn't Windows users? (And what harm can an unsigned binary
do to a "secure environment", anyway? If it's adversely affected, it
can't be that secure, can it?)
And what's the backup plan if users use this to boot into compromised
Windows systems?
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