linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <87hap3zbw7.fsf@xmission.com>
Date:	Mon, 05 Nov 2012 18:46:32 -0800
From:	ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
Cc:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
	Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support

Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org> writes:

> On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 11:16:12AM -0800, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org> writes:
>> > No, in the general case the system will do that once it fails to find a 
>> > bootable OS on the drive.
>> 
>> In the general case there will be a bootable OS on the drive.
>
> That's in no way a given.

You have it backwards.  The conclusion here is that having a case where
a non-interactive install is possible is not a given.

Therefore inflicting the entire rest of the ecosystem with requirements
that only exist in the union of the requirements for non-interactive
installs and installs on a machine with an existing machine does not
make sense.

In situations where a non-interactive install is interesting.  Aka
an empty boot disk it is not interesting to guard against.

In situations where interaction happens is where windows may already exists
and so spoofing windows is a design consideration and and a user
presence test does not break the design.

Eric
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/