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Message-ID: <y0my53zqmy1.fsf@fche.csb>
Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2013 11:31:18 -0500
From: fche@...hat.com (Frank Ch. Eigler)
To: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@...achi.com>,
Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@...ux.intel.com>,
Jovi Zhangwei <jovi.zhangwei@...il.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH tip 0/5] tracing filters with BPF
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org> writes:
> [...] While it sounds interesting, I would strongly advise to make
> this capability only available to root. Traditionally lots of
> complex byte code languages which were designed to be "safe" and
> verifiable weren't really. e.g. i managed to crash things with
> "safe" systemtap multiple times. [...]
Note that systemtap has never been a byte code language, that avenue
being considered lkml-futile at the time, but instead pure C. Its
safety comes from a mix of compiled-in checks (which you can inspect
via "stap -p3") and script-to-C translation checks (which are
self-explanatory). Its risks come from bugs in the checks (quite
rare), problems in the runtime library (rare), and problems in
underlying kernel facilities (rare or frequent - consider kprobes).
> So the likelyhood of this having some hole somewhere (either in
> the byte code or in some library function) is high.
Very true!
- FChE
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