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Message-ID: <1402456095.612.32.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:15 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>,
keyrings <keyrings@...ux-nfs.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] KEYS: validate key trust with owner and builtin
keys only
On Wed, 2014-06-11 at 03:22 +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 09:24:53PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Tue, 2014-06-10 at 22:40 +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > The hole is that the system trusts keys that you don't trust. The
> > > appropriate thing to do is to remove that trust from the entire system,
> > > not just one layer of the system. If people gain the impression that
> > > they can simply pass a kernel parameter and avoid trusting the vendor
> > > keys, they'll be upset to discover that it's easily circumvented.
> >
> > Assuming I remove all the keys I don't trust, there are still keys that
> > are trusted while booting, but are not necessary afterwards. We should
> > be able to limit the scope of where and when keys are trusted.
>
> Providing a userspace mechanism for selectively dropping keys from the
> kernel seems like a good thing?
No, patch "KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key" adds
signed public keys.
Mimi
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