linux-kernel - Re: [patch RFC 5/5] x86/speculation: Add basic speculation control code

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Message-ID: <20180110120158.GB9706@redhat.com>
Date:   Wed, 10 Jan 2018 13:01:58 +0100
From:   Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
To:     David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Cc:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...uxfoundation.org>, x86@...nel.org,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [patch RFC 5/5] x86/speculation: Add basic speculation control
 code

On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 11:58:54AM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On Wed, 2018-01-10 at 12:54 +0100, Andrea Arcangeli wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 09:27:59AM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> > > I don't know why you're calling that 'IBRS=2'; are you getting
> > confused
> > > by Andrea's distro horridness?
> > 
> > Eh, yes he's got confused. ibrs_enabled 2 simply means to leave IBRS
> > set in SPEC_CTLR 100% of the time, except in guest mode.
> 
> On all current hardware, if you only set IBRS when you exit a guest,
> then you are not protecting yourself from userspace at all. IBRS acts
> as a *barrier* in all current hardware.

Kernel memory is 100% protected if you set only IBRS at vmexit.

Once IBRS is set, there's no way any userland (nor host nor guest) can
attack the kernel memory through spectre variant#2.

What is not protected is host userland from guest userland which is
point 3 in the email I posted earlier and I already provided all
details there on how to fix that purely theoretical issue not part of
the PoC with the provided debugfs tunables, so I won't repeat here.