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Message-ID: <1531899055-29362-6-git-send-email-wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 15:30:55 +0800
From: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@...wei.com>
To: <agk@...hat.com>, <snitzer@...hat.com>,
<herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
CC: <dm-devel@...hat.com>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<wangxiongfeng2@...wei.com>, <broonie@...nel.org>, <arnd@...db.de>,
<jonathan.cameron@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] dm-crypt: modify dm-crypt to rely on IV generation templates
This patch remove the IV generation algorithms from dm-crypt.c and rely
on the IV generation templates for generating IV. We modify the dm-layer
to send a whole 'bio' (as defined in the block layer) at a time. Each bio
contains an in memory representation of physically contiguous disk
blocks. The dm layer sets up a chained scatterlist of these blocks split
into physically contiguous segments in memory so that DMA can be
performed.
This patch is based on the patchset originally started by
Binoy Jayan <binoy.jayan@...aro.org>
( crypto: Add IV generation algorithms
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9803469/ )
Signed-off-by: Binoy Jayan <binoy.jayan@...aro.org>
Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@...aro.org>
---
drivers/md/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 1697 ++++++++++---------------------------------------
2 files changed, 345 insertions(+), 1353 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/md/Kconfig b/drivers/md/Kconfig
index 8b8c123..51a3451 100644
--- a/drivers/md/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/md/Kconfig
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ config DM_CRYPT
depends on BLK_DEV_DM
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_CBC
+ select CRYPTO_GENIV
---help---
This device-mapper target allows you to create a device that
transparently encrypts the data on it. You'll need to activate
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index b61b069..3761a43 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -33,13 +33,20 @@
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <crypto/authenc.h>
+#include <crypto/geniv.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h> /* for struct rtattr and RTA macros only */
#include <keys/user-type.h>
-
#include <linux/device-mapper.h>
+#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
+#include <linux/log2.h>
#define DM_MSG_PREFIX "crypt"
+struct geniv_ctx;
+struct geniv_req_ctx;
+
/*
* context holding the current state of a multi-part conversion
*/
@@ -55,7 +62,6 @@ struct convert_context {
struct skcipher_request *req;
struct aead_request *req_aead;
} r;
-
};
/*
@@ -79,47 +85,13 @@ struct dm_crypt_io {
struct dm_crypt_request {
struct convert_context *ctx;
- struct scatterlist sg_in[4];
- struct scatterlist sg_out[4];
+ struct scatterlist *sg_in;
+ struct scatterlist *sg_out;
sector_t iv_sector;
};
struct crypt_config;
-struct crypt_iv_operations {
- int (*ctr)(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
- const char *opts);
- void (*dtr)(struct crypt_config *cc);
- int (*init)(struct crypt_config *cc);
- int (*wipe)(struct crypt_config *cc);
- int (*generator)(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq);
- int (*post)(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq);
-};
-
-struct iv_essiv_private {
- struct crypto_ahash *hash_tfm;
- u8 *salt;
-};
-
-struct iv_benbi_private {
- int shift;
-};
-
-#define LMK_SEED_SIZE 64 /* hash + 0 */
-struct iv_lmk_private {
- struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
- u8 *seed;
-};
-
-#define TCW_WHITENING_SIZE 16
-struct iv_tcw_private {
- struct crypto_shash *crc32_tfm;
- u8 *iv_seed;
- u8 *whitening;
-};
-
/*
* Crypt: maps a linear range of a block device
* and encrypts / decrypts at the same time.
@@ -127,11 +99,6 @@ struct iv_tcw_private {
enum flags { DM_CRYPT_SUSPENDED, DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID,
DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD };
-enum cipher_flags {
- CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_AEAD, /* Use authenticated mode for cihper */
- CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, /* Calculate IV from sector_size, not 512B sectors */
-};
-
/*
* The fields in here must be read only after initialization.
*/
@@ -148,18 +115,10 @@ struct crypt_config {
struct task_struct *write_thread;
struct rb_root write_tree;
- char *cipher;
char *cipher_string;
char *cipher_auth;
char *key_string;
- const struct crypt_iv_operations *iv_gen_ops;
- union {
- struct iv_essiv_private essiv;
- struct iv_benbi_private benbi;
- struct iv_lmk_private lmk;
- struct iv_tcw_private tcw;
- } iv_gen_private;
sector_t iv_offset;
unsigned int iv_size;
unsigned short int sector_size;
@@ -168,10 +127,10 @@ struct crypt_config {
/* ESSIV: struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm */
void *iv_private;
union {
- struct crypto_skcipher **tfms;
- struct crypto_aead **tfms_aead;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm_aead;
} cipher_tfm;
- unsigned tfms_count;
+ unsigned int tfms_count;
unsigned long cipher_flags;
/*
@@ -213,13 +172,16 @@ struct crypt_config {
struct bio_set bs;
struct mutex bio_alloc_lock;
- u8 *authenc_key; /* space for keys in authenc() format (if used) */
u8 key[0];
};
-#define MIN_IOS 64
-#define MAX_TAG_SIZE 480
-#define POOL_ENTRY_SIZE 512
+#define MAX_SG_LIST (BIO_MAX_PAGES * 8)
+#define MIN_IOS 64
+#define MAX_TAG_SIZE 480
+#define POOL_ENTRY_SIZE 512
+
+static void clone_init(struct dm_crypt_io *, struct bio *);
+static void kcryptd_queue_crypt(struct dm_crypt_io *io);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(dm_crypt_clients_lock);
static unsigned dm_crypt_clients_n = 0;
@@ -229,677 +191,21 @@ struct crypt_config {
static void clone_init(struct dm_crypt_io *, struct bio *);
static void kcryptd_queue_crypt(struct dm_crypt_io *io);
-static struct scatterlist *crypt_get_sg_data(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct scatterlist *sg);
/*
* Use this to access cipher attributes that are independent of the key.
*/
static struct crypto_skcipher *any_tfm(struct crypt_config *cc)
{
- return cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[0];
+ return cc->cipher_tfm.tfm;
}
static struct crypto_aead *any_tfm_aead(struct crypt_config *cc)
{
- return cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0];
+ return cc->cipher_tfm.tfm_aead;
}
/*
- * Different IV generation algorithms:
- *
- * plain: the initial vector is the 32-bit little-endian version of the sector
- * number, padded with zeros if necessary.
- *
- * plain64: the initial vector is the 64-bit little-endian version of the sector
- * number, padded with zeros if necessary.
- *
- * plain64be: the initial vector is the 64-bit big-endian version of the sector
- * number, padded with zeros if necessary.
- *
- * essiv: "encrypted sector|salt initial vector", the sector number is
- * encrypted with the bulk cipher using a salt as key. The salt
- * should be derived from the bulk cipher's key via hashing.
- *
- * benbi: the 64-bit "big-endian 'narrow block'-count", starting at 1
- * (needed for LRW-32-AES and possible other narrow block modes)
- *
- * null: the initial vector is always zero. Provides compatibility with
- * obsolete loop_fish2 devices. Do not use for new devices.
- *
- * lmk: Compatible implementation of the block chaining mode used
- * by the Loop-AES block device encryption system
- * designed by Jari Ruusu. See http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net/
- * It operates on full 512 byte sectors and uses CBC
- * with an IV derived from the sector number, the data and
- * optionally extra IV seed.
- * This means that after decryption the first block
- * of sector must be tweaked according to decrypted data.
- * Loop-AES can use three encryption schemes:
- * version 1: is plain aes-cbc mode
- * version 2: uses 64 multikey scheme with lmk IV generator
- * version 3: the same as version 2 with additional IV seed
- * (it uses 65 keys, last key is used as IV seed)
- *
- * tcw: Compatible implementation of the block chaining mode used
- * by the TrueCrypt device encryption system (prior to version 4.1).
- * For more info see: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/TrueCryptOnDiskFormat
- * It operates on full 512 byte sectors and uses CBC
- * with an IV derived from initial key and the sector number.
- * In addition, whitening value is applied on every sector, whitening
- * is calculated from initial key, sector number and mixed using CRC32.
- * Note that this encryption scheme is vulnerable to watermarking attacks
- * and should be used for old compatible containers access only.
- *
- * plumb: unimplemented, see:
- * http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.device-mapper.dm-crypt/454
- */
-
-static int crypt_iv_plain_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
- *(__le32 *)iv = cpu_to_le32(dmreq->iv_sector & 0xffffffff);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_plain64_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
- *(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_plain64be_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
- /* iv_size is at least of size u64; usually it is 16 bytes */
- *(__be64 *)&iv[cc->iv_size - sizeof(u64)] = cpu_to_be64(dmreq->iv_sector);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Initialise ESSIV - compute salt but no local memory allocations */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
- AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, essiv->hash_tfm);
- struct scatterlist sg;
- struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
- int err;
-
- sg_init_one(&sg, cc->key, cc->key_size);
- ahash_request_set_tfm(req, essiv->hash_tfm);
- ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
- ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, essiv->salt, cc->key_size);
-
- err = crypto_ahash_digest(req);
- ahash_request_zero(req);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
- err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt,
- crypto_ahash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm));
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Wipe salt and reset key derived from volume key */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
- unsigned salt_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm);
- struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
- int r, err = 0;
-
- memset(essiv->salt, 0, salt_size);
-
- essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
- r = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt, salt_size);
- if (r)
- err = r;
-
- return err;
-}
-
-/* Allocate the cipher for ESSIV */
-static struct crypto_cipher *alloc_essiv_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct dm_target *ti,
- const u8 *salt,
- unsigned int saltsize)
-{
- struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
- int err;
-
- /* Setup the essiv_tfm with the given salt */
- essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(cc->cipher, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
- ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm for ESSIV";
- return essiv_tfm;
- }
-
- if (crypto_cipher_blocksize(essiv_tfm) != cc->iv_size) {
- ti->error = "Block size of ESSIV cipher does "
- "not match IV size of block cipher";
- crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- }
-
- err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, saltsize);
- if (err) {
- ti->error = "Failed to set key for ESSIV cipher";
- crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
- return ERR_PTR(err);
- }
-
- return essiv_tfm;
-}
-
-static void crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
- struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-
- crypto_free_ahash(essiv->hash_tfm);
- essiv->hash_tfm = NULL;
-
- kzfree(essiv->salt);
- essiv->salt = NULL;
-
- essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
- if (essiv_tfm)
- crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-
- cc->iv_private = NULL;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
- const char *opts)
-{
- struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = NULL;
- struct crypto_ahash *hash_tfm = NULL;
- u8 *salt = NULL;
- int err;
-
- if (!opts) {
- ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- /* Allocate hash algorithm */
- hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(opts, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
- ti->error = "Error initializing ESSIV hash";
- err = PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
- goto bad;
- }
-
- salt = kzalloc(crypto_ahash_digestsize(hash_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!salt) {
- ti->error = "Error kmallocing salt storage in ESSIV";
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad;
- }
-
- cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.salt = salt;
- cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.hash_tfm = hash_tfm;
-
- essiv_tfm = alloc_essiv_cipher(cc, ti, salt,
- crypto_ahash_digestsize(hash_tfm));
- if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
- crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(cc);
- return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
- }
- cc->iv_private = essiv_tfm;
-
- return 0;
-
-bad:
- if (hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
- crypto_free_ahash(hash_tfm);
- kfree(salt);
- return err;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
- memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
- *(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(essiv_tfm, iv, iv);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_benbi_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
- const char *opts)
-{
- unsigned bs = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(any_tfm(cc));
- int log = ilog2(bs);
-
- /* we need to calculate how far we must shift the sector count
- * to get the cipher block count, we use this shift in _gen */
-
- if (1 << log != bs) {
- ti->error = "cypher blocksize is not a power of 2";
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (log > 9) {
- ti->error = "cypher blocksize is > 512";
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- cc->iv_gen_private.benbi.shift = 9 - log;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void crypt_iv_benbi_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_benbi_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- __be64 val;
-
- memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size - sizeof(u64)); /* rest is cleared below */
-
- val = cpu_to_be64(((u64)dmreq->iv_sector << cc->iv_gen_private.benbi.shift) + 1);
- put_unaligned(val, (__be64 *)(iv + cc->iv_size - sizeof(u64)));
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_null_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void crypt_iv_lmk_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk;
-
- if (lmk->hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(lmk->hash_tfm))
- crypto_free_shash(lmk->hash_tfm);
- lmk->hash_tfm = NULL;
-
- kzfree(lmk->seed);
- lmk->seed = NULL;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_lmk_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
- const char *opts)
-{
- struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk;
-
- if (cc->sector_size != (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
- ti->error = "Unsupported sector size for LMK";
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- lmk->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("md5", 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(lmk->hash_tfm)) {
- ti->error = "Error initializing LMK hash";
- return PTR_ERR(lmk->hash_tfm);
- }
-
- /* No seed in LMK version 2 */
- if (cc->key_parts == cc->tfms_count) {
- lmk->seed = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
-
- lmk->seed = kzalloc(LMK_SEED_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!lmk->seed) {
- crypt_iv_lmk_dtr(cc);
- ti->error = "Error kmallocing seed storage in LMK";
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_lmk_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk;
- int subkey_size = cc->key_size / cc->key_parts;
-
- /* LMK seed is on the position of LMK_KEYS + 1 key */
- if (lmk->seed)
- memcpy(lmk->seed, cc->key + (cc->tfms_count * subkey_size),
- crypto_shash_digestsize(lmk->hash_tfm));
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_lmk_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk;
-
- if (lmk->seed)
- memset(lmk->seed, 0, LMK_SEED_SIZE);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_lmk_one(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq,
- u8 *data)
-{
- struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk;
- SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, lmk->hash_tfm);
- struct md5_state md5state;
- __le32 buf[4];
- int i, r;
-
- desc->tfm = lmk->hash_tfm;
- desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
-
- r = crypto_shash_init(desc);
- if (r)
- return r;
-
- if (lmk->seed) {
- r = crypto_shash_update(desc, lmk->seed, LMK_SEED_SIZE);
- if (r)
- return r;
- }
-
- /* Sector is always 512B, block size 16, add data of blocks 1-31 */
- r = crypto_shash_update(desc, data + 16, 16 * 31);
- if (r)
- return r;
-
- /* Sector is cropped to 56 bits here */
- buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(dmreq->iv_sector & 0xFFFFFFFF);
- buf[1] = cpu_to_le32((((u64)dmreq->iv_sector >> 32) & 0x00FFFFFF) | 0x80000000);
- buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(4024);
- buf[3] = 0;
- r = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (r)
- return r;
-
- /* No MD5 padding here */
- r = crypto_shash_export(desc, &md5state);
- if (r)
- return r;
-
- for (i = 0; i < MD5_HASH_WORDS; i++)
- __cpu_to_le32s(&md5state.hash[i]);
- memcpy(iv, &md5state.hash, cc->iv_size);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_lmk_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- struct scatterlist *sg;
- u8 *src;
- int r = 0;
-
- if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) {
- sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, dmreq->sg_in);
- src = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg));
- r = crypt_iv_lmk_one(cc, iv, dmreq, src + sg->offset);
- kunmap_atomic(src);
- } else
- memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
-
- return r;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_lmk_post(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- struct scatterlist *sg;
- u8 *dst;
- int r;
-
- if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) == WRITE)
- return 0;
-
- sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, dmreq->sg_out);
- dst = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg));
- r = crypt_iv_lmk_one(cc, iv, dmreq, dst + sg->offset);
-
- /* Tweak the first block of plaintext sector */
- if (!r)
- crypto_xor(dst + sg->offset, iv, cc->iv_size);
-
- kunmap_atomic(dst);
- return r;
-}
-
-static void crypt_iv_tcw_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
-
- kzfree(tcw->iv_seed);
- tcw->iv_seed = NULL;
- kzfree(tcw->whitening);
- tcw->whitening = NULL;
-
- if (tcw->crc32_tfm && !IS_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm))
- crypto_free_shash(tcw->crc32_tfm);
- tcw->crc32_tfm = NULL;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_tcw_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
- const char *opts)
-{
- struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
-
- if (cc->sector_size != (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
- ti->error = "Unsupported sector size for TCW";
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (cc->key_size <= (cc->iv_size + TCW_WHITENING_SIZE)) {
- ti->error = "Wrong key size for TCW";
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- tcw->crc32_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("crc32", 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm)) {
- ti->error = "Error initializing CRC32 in TCW";
- return PTR_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm);
- }
-
- tcw->iv_seed = kzalloc(cc->iv_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- tcw->whitening = kzalloc(TCW_WHITENING_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tcw->iv_seed || !tcw->whitening) {
- crypt_iv_tcw_dtr(cc);
- ti->error = "Error allocating seed storage in TCW";
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_tcw_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
- int key_offset = cc->key_size - cc->iv_size - TCW_WHITENING_SIZE;
-
- memcpy(tcw->iv_seed, &cc->key[key_offset], cc->iv_size);
- memcpy(tcw->whitening, &cc->key[key_offset + cc->iv_size],
- TCW_WHITENING_SIZE);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_tcw_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
-
- memset(tcw->iv_seed, 0, cc->iv_size);
- memset(tcw->whitening, 0, TCW_WHITENING_SIZE);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq,
- u8 *data)
-{
- struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
- __le64 sector = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
- u8 buf[TCW_WHITENING_SIZE];
- SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tcw->crc32_tfm);
- int i, r;
-
- /* xor whitening with sector number */
- crypto_xor_cpy(buf, tcw->whitening, (u8 *)§or, 8);
- crypto_xor_cpy(&buf[8], tcw->whitening + 8, (u8 *)§or, 8);
-
- /* calculate crc32 for every 32bit part and xor it */
- desc->tfm = tcw->crc32_tfm;
- desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
- r = crypto_shash_init(desc);
- if (r)
- goto out;
- r = crypto_shash_update(desc, &buf[i * 4], 4);
- if (r)
- goto out;
- r = crypto_shash_final(desc, &buf[i * 4]);
- if (r)
- goto out;
- }
- crypto_xor(&buf[0], &buf[12], 4);
- crypto_xor(&buf[4], &buf[8], 4);
-
- /* apply whitening (8 bytes) to whole sector */
- for (i = 0; i < ((1 << SECTOR_SHIFT) / 8); i++)
- crypto_xor(data + i * 8, buf, 8);
-out:
- memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf));
- return r;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_tcw_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- struct scatterlist *sg;
- struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
- __le64 sector = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
- u8 *src;
- int r = 0;
-
- /* Remove whitening from ciphertext */
- if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) {
- sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, dmreq->sg_in);
- src = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg));
- r = crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(cc, dmreq, src + sg->offset);
- kunmap_atomic(src);
- }
-
- /* Calculate IV */
- crypto_xor_cpy(iv, tcw->iv_seed, (u8 *)§or, 8);
- if (cc->iv_size > 8)
- crypto_xor_cpy(&iv[8], tcw->iv_seed + 8, (u8 *)§or,
- cc->iv_size - 8);
-
- return r;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_tcw_post(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- struct scatterlist *sg;
- u8 *dst;
- int r;
-
- if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE)
- return 0;
-
- /* Apply whitening on ciphertext */
- sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, dmreq->sg_out);
- dst = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg));
- r = crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(cc, dmreq, dst + sg->offset);
- kunmap_atomic(dst);
-
- return r;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_random_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- /* Used only for writes, there must be an additional space to store IV */
- get_random_bytes(iv, cc->iv_size);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain_ops = {
- .generator = crypt_iv_plain_gen
-};
-
-static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain64_ops = {
- .generator = crypt_iv_plain64_gen
-};
-
-static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain64be_ops = {
- .generator = crypt_iv_plain64be_gen
-};
-
-static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_essiv_ops = {
- .ctr = crypt_iv_essiv_ctr,
- .dtr = crypt_iv_essiv_dtr,
- .init = crypt_iv_essiv_init,
- .wipe = crypt_iv_essiv_wipe,
- .generator = crypt_iv_essiv_gen
-};
-
-static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_benbi_ops = {
- .ctr = crypt_iv_benbi_ctr,
- .dtr = crypt_iv_benbi_dtr,
- .generator = crypt_iv_benbi_gen
-};
-
-static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_null_ops = {
- .generator = crypt_iv_null_gen
-};
-
-static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_lmk_ops = {
- .ctr = crypt_iv_lmk_ctr,
- .dtr = crypt_iv_lmk_dtr,
- .init = crypt_iv_lmk_init,
- .wipe = crypt_iv_lmk_wipe,
- .generator = crypt_iv_lmk_gen,
- .post = crypt_iv_lmk_post
-};
-
-static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_tcw_ops = {
- .ctr = crypt_iv_tcw_ctr,
- .dtr = crypt_iv_tcw_dtr,
- .init = crypt_iv_tcw_init,
- .wipe = crypt_iv_tcw_wipe,
- .generator = crypt_iv_tcw_gen,
- .post = crypt_iv_tcw_post
-};
-
-static struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_random_ops = {
- .generator = crypt_iv_random_gen
-};
-
-/*
* Integrity extensions
*/
static bool crypt_integrity_aead(struct crypt_config *cc)
@@ -907,21 +213,6 @@ static bool crypt_integrity_aead(struct crypt_config *cc)
return test_bit(CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_AEAD, &cc->cipher_flags);
}
-static bool crypt_integrity_hmac(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- return crypt_integrity_aead(cc) && cc->key_mac_size;
-}
-
-/* Get sg containing data */
-static struct scatterlist *crypt_get_sg_data(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct scatterlist *sg)
-{
- if (unlikely(crypt_integrity_aead(cc)))
- return &sg[2];
-
- return sg;
-}
-
static int dm_crypt_integrity_io_alloc(struct dm_crypt_io *io, struct bio *bio)
{
struct bio_integrity_payload *bip;
@@ -971,283 +262,66 @@ static int crypt_integrity_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti)
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
cc->integrity_tag_size = cc->on_disk_tag_size - cc->integrity_iv_size;
- DMINFO("Integrity AEAD, tag size %u, IV size %u.",
- cc->integrity_tag_size, cc->integrity_iv_size);
-
- if (crypto_aead_setauthsize(any_tfm_aead(cc), cc->integrity_tag_size)) {
- ti->error = "Integrity AEAD auth tag size is not supported.";
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- } else if (cc->integrity_iv_size)
- DMINFO("Additional per-sector space %u bytes for IV.",
- cc->integrity_iv_size);
-
- if ((cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size) != bi->tag_size) {
- ti->error = "Not enough space for integrity tag in the profile.";
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- return 0;
-#else
- ti->error = "Integrity profile not supported.";
- return -EINVAL;
-#endif
-}
-
-static void crypt_convert_init(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct convert_context *ctx,
- struct bio *bio_out, struct bio *bio_in,
- sector_t sector)
-{
- ctx->bio_in = bio_in;
- ctx->bio_out = bio_out;
- if (bio_in)
- ctx->iter_in = bio_in->bi_iter;
- if (bio_out)
- ctx->iter_out = bio_out->bi_iter;
- ctx->cc_sector = sector + cc->iv_offset;
- init_completion(&ctx->restart);
-}
-
-static struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq_of_req(struct crypt_config *cc,
- void *req)
-{
- return (struct dm_crypt_request *)((char *)req + cc->dmreq_start);
-}
-
-static void *req_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- return (void *)((char *)dmreq - cc->dmreq_start);
-}
-
-static u8 *iv_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
- return (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(dmreq + 1),
- crypto_aead_alignmask(any_tfm_aead(cc)) + 1);
- else
- return (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(dmreq + 1),
- crypto_skcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) + 1);
-}
-
-static u8 *org_iv_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- return iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) + cc->iv_size;
-}
-
-static uint64_t *org_sector_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- u8 *ptr = iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) + cc->iv_size + cc->iv_size;
- return (uint64_t*) ptr;
-}
-
-static unsigned int *org_tag_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- u8 *ptr = iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) + cc->iv_size +
- cc->iv_size + sizeof(uint64_t);
- return (unsigned int*)ptr;
-}
-
-static void *tag_from_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- struct convert_context *ctx = dmreq->ctx;
- struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(ctx, struct dm_crypt_io, ctx);
-
- return &io->integrity_metadata[*org_tag_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) *
- cc->on_disk_tag_size];
-}
-
-static void *iv_tag_from_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
-{
- return tag_from_dmreq(cc, dmreq) + cc->integrity_tag_size;
-}
-
-static int crypt_convert_block_aead(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct convert_context *ctx,
- struct aead_request *req,
- unsigned int tag_offset)
-{
- struct bio_vec bv_in = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_in, ctx->iter_in);
- struct bio_vec bv_out = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_out, ctx->iter_out);
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq;
- u8 *iv, *org_iv, *tag_iv, *tag;
- uint64_t *sector;
- int r = 0;
-
- BUG_ON(cc->integrity_iv_size && cc->integrity_iv_size != cc->iv_size);
-
- /* Reject unexpected unaligned bio. */
- if (unlikely(bv_in.bv_len & (cc->sector_size - 1)))
- return -EIO;
-
- dmreq = dmreq_of_req(cc, req);
- dmreq->iv_sector = ctx->cc_sector;
- if (test_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags))
- dmreq->iv_sector >>= cc->sector_shift;
- dmreq->ctx = ctx;
-
- *org_tag_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) = tag_offset;
-
- sector = org_sector_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
- *sector = cpu_to_le64(ctx->cc_sector - cc->iv_offset);
-
- iv = iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
- org_iv = org_iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
- tag = tag_from_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
- tag_iv = iv_tag_from_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
-
- /* AEAD request:
- * |----- AAD -------|------ DATA -------|-- AUTH TAG --|
- * | (authenticated) | (auth+encryption) | |
- * | sector_LE | IV | sector in/out | tag in/out |
- */
- sg_init_table(dmreq->sg_in, 4);
- sg_set_buf(&dmreq->sg_in[0], sector, sizeof(uint64_t));
- sg_set_buf(&dmreq->sg_in[1], org_iv, cc->iv_size);
- sg_set_page(&dmreq->sg_in[2], bv_in.bv_page, cc->sector_size, bv_in.bv_offset);
- sg_set_buf(&dmreq->sg_in[3], tag, cc->integrity_tag_size);
-
- sg_init_table(dmreq->sg_out, 4);
- sg_set_buf(&dmreq->sg_out[0], sector, sizeof(uint64_t));
- sg_set_buf(&dmreq->sg_out[1], org_iv, cc->iv_size);
- sg_set_page(&dmreq->sg_out[2], bv_out.bv_page, cc->sector_size, bv_out.bv_offset);
- sg_set_buf(&dmreq->sg_out[3], tag, cc->integrity_tag_size);
-
- if (cc->iv_gen_ops) {
- /* For READs use IV stored in integrity metadata */
- if (cc->integrity_iv_size && bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) {
- memcpy(org_iv, tag_iv, cc->iv_size);
- } else {
- r = cc->iv_gen_ops->generator(cc, org_iv, dmreq);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- /* Store generated IV in integrity metadata */
- if (cc->integrity_iv_size)
- memcpy(tag_iv, org_iv, cc->iv_size);
- }
- /* Working copy of IV, to be modified in crypto API */
- memcpy(iv, org_iv, cc->iv_size);
- }
-
- aead_request_set_ad(req, sizeof(uint64_t) + cc->iv_size);
- if (bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) {
- aead_request_set_crypt(req, dmreq->sg_in, dmreq->sg_out,
- cc->sector_size, iv);
- r = crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
- if (cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size != cc->on_disk_tag_size)
- memset(tag + cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size, 0,
- cc->on_disk_tag_size - (cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size));
- } else {
- aead_request_set_crypt(req, dmreq->sg_in, dmreq->sg_out,
- cc->sector_size + cc->integrity_tag_size, iv);
- r = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
- }
-
- if (r == -EBADMSG)
- DMERR_LIMIT("INTEGRITY AEAD ERROR, sector %llu",
- (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(*sector));
-
- if (!r && cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->post)
- r = cc->iv_gen_ops->post(cc, org_iv, dmreq);
-
- bio_advance_iter(ctx->bio_in, &ctx->iter_in, cc->sector_size);
- bio_advance_iter(ctx->bio_out, &ctx->iter_out, cc->sector_size);
-
- return r;
-}
-
-static int crypt_convert_block_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct convert_context *ctx,
- struct skcipher_request *req,
- unsigned int tag_offset)
-{
- struct bio_vec bv_in = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_in, ctx->iter_in);
- struct bio_vec bv_out = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_out, ctx->iter_out);
- struct scatterlist *sg_in, *sg_out;
- struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq;
- u8 *iv, *org_iv, *tag_iv;
- uint64_t *sector;
- int r = 0;
-
- /* Reject unexpected unaligned bio. */
- if (unlikely(bv_in.bv_len & (cc->sector_size - 1)))
- return -EIO;
-
- dmreq = dmreq_of_req(cc, req);
- dmreq->iv_sector = ctx->cc_sector;
- if (test_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags))
- dmreq->iv_sector >>= cc->sector_shift;
- dmreq->ctx = ctx;
-
- *org_tag_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) = tag_offset;
-
- iv = iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
- org_iv = org_iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
- tag_iv = iv_tag_from_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
-
- sector = org_sector_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
- *sector = cpu_to_le64(ctx->cc_sector - cc->iv_offset);
-
- /* For skcipher we use only the first sg item */
- sg_in = &dmreq->sg_in[0];
- sg_out = &dmreq->sg_out[0];
-
- sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
- sg_set_page(sg_in, bv_in.bv_page, cc->sector_size, bv_in.bv_offset);
-
- sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
- sg_set_page(sg_out, bv_out.bv_page, cc->sector_size, bv_out.bv_offset);
+ DMINFO("Integrity AEAD, tag size %u, IV size %u.",
+ cc->integrity_tag_size, cc->integrity_iv_size);
- if (cc->iv_gen_ops) {
- /* For READs use IV stored in integrity metadata */
- if (cc->integrity_iv_size && bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) {
- memcpy(org_iv, tag_iv, cc->integrity_iv_size);
- } else {
- r = cc->iv_gen_ops->generator(cc, org_iv, dmreq);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- /* Store generated IV in integrity metadata */
- if (cc->integrity_iv_size)
- memcpy(tag_iv, org_iv, cc->integrity_iv_size);
+ if (crypto_aead_setauthsize(any_tfm_aead(cc), cc->integrity_tag_size)) {
+ ti->error = "Integrity AEAD auth tag size is not supported.";
+ return -EINVAL;
}
- /* Working copy of IV, to be modified in crypto API */
- memcpy(iv, org_iv, cc->iv_size);
- }
+ } else if (cc->integrity_iv_size)
+ DMINFO("Additional per-sector space %u bytes for IV.",
+ cc->integrity_iv_size);
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, cc->sector_size, iv);
+ if ((cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size) != bi->tag_size) {
+ ti->error = "Not enough space for integrity tag in the profile.";
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- if (bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) == WRITE)
- r = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
- else
- r = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+ return 0;
+#else
+ ti->error = "Integrity profile not supported.";
+ return -EINVAL;
+#endif
+}
- if (!r && cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->post)
- r = cc->iv_gen_ops->post(cc, org_iv, dmreq);
+static void crypt_convert_init(struct crypt_config *cc,
+ struct convert_context *ctx,
+ struct bio *bio_out, struct bio *bio_in,
+ sector_t sector)
+{
+ ctx->bio_in = bio_in;
+ ctx->bio_out = bio_out;
+ if (bio_in)
+ ctx->iter_in = bio_in->bi_iter;
+ if (bio_out)
+ ctx->iter_out = bio_out->bi_iter;
+ ctx->cc_sector = sector + cc->iv_offset;
+ init_completion(&ctx->restart);
+}
- bio_advance_iter(ctx->bio_in, &ctx->iter_in, cc->sector_size);
- bio_advance_iter(ctx->bio_out, &ctx->iter_out, cc->sector_size);
+static struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq_of_req(struct crypt_config *cc,
+ void *req)
+{
+ return (struct dm_crypt_request *)((char *)req + cc->dmreq_start);
+}
- return r;
+static void *req_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
+{
+ return (void *)((char *)dmreq - cc->dmreq_start);
}
+
static void kcryptd_async_done(struct crypto_async_request *async_req,
int error);
static void crypt_alloc_req_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc,
struct convert_context *ctx)
{
- unsigned key_index = ctx->cc_sector & (cc->tfms_count - 1);
-
if (!ctx->r.req)
ctx->r.req = mempool_alloc(&cc->req_pool, GFP_NOIO);
- skcipher_request_set_tfm(ctx->r.req, cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[key_index]);
+ skcipher_request_set_tfm(ctx->r.req, cc->cipher_tfm.tfm);
/*
* Use REQ_MAY_BACKLOG so a cipher driver internally backlogs
@@ -1264,7 +338,7 @@ static void crypt_alloc_req_aead(struct crypt_config *cc,
if (!ctx->r.req_aead)
ctx->r.req_aead = mempool_alloc(&cc->req_pool, GFP_NOIO);
- aead_request_set_tfm(ctx->r.req_aead, cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0]);
+ aead_request_set_tfm(ctx->r.req_aead, cc->cipher_tfm.tfm_aead);
/*
* Use REQ_MAY_BACKLOG so a cipher driver internally backlogs
@@ -1313,67 +387,124 @@ static void crypt_free_req(struct crypt_config *cc, void *req, struct bio *base_
/*
* Encrypt / decrypt data from one bio to another one (can be the same one)
*/
-static blk_status_t crypt_convert(struct crypt_config *cc,
- struct convert_context *ctx)
+static blk_status_t crypt_convert_bio(struct crypt_config *cc,
+ struct convert_context *ctx)
{
- unsigned int tag_offset = 0;
- unsigned int sector_step = cc->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT;
+ unsigned int cryptlen, n1, n2, nents, i = 0, bytes = 0;
+ struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
+ struct aead_request *req_aead = NULL;
+ struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq;
+ struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(ctx, struct dm_crypt_io, ctx);
+ struct geniv_req_info rinfo;
+ struct bio_vec bv_in, bv_out;
int r;
atomic_set(&ctx->cc_pending, 1);
+ crypt_alloc_req(cc, ctx);
- while (ctx->iter_in.bi_size && ctx->iter_out.bi_size) {
+ if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
+ req_aead = ctx->r.req_aead;
+ dmreq = dmreq_of_req(cc, req_aead);
+ } else {
+ req = ctx->r.req;
+ dmreq = dmreq_of_req(cc, req);
+ }
- crypt_alloc_req(cc, ctx);
- atomic_inc(&ctx->cc_pending);
+ n1 = bio_segments(ctx->bio_in);
+ n2 = bio_segments(ctx->bio_out);
+ nents = n1 > n2 ? n1 : n2;
+ nents = nents > MAX_SG_LIST ? MAX_SG_LIST : nents;
+ cryptlen = ctx->iter_in.bi_size;
- if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
- r = crypt_convert_block_aead(cc, ctx, ctx->r.req_aead, tag_offset);
- else
- r = crypt_convert_block_skcipher(cc, ctx, ctx->r.req, tag_offset);
+ DMDEBUG("dm-crypt:%s: segments:[in=%u, out=%u] bi_size=%u\n",
+ bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) == WRITE ? "write" : "read",
+ n1, n2, cryptlen);
- switch (r) {
- /*
- * The request was queued by a crypto driver
- * but the driver request queue is full, let's wait.
- */
- case -EBUSY:
- wait_for_completion(&ctx->restart);
- reinit_completion(&ctx->restart);
- /* fall through */
- /*
- * The request is queued and processed asynchronously,
- * completion function kcryptd_async_done() will be called.
- */
- case -EINPROGRESS:
- ctx->r.req = NULL;
- ctx->cc_sector += sector_step;
- tag_offset++;
- continue;
- /*
- * The request was already processed (synchronously).
- */
- case 0:
- atomic_dec(&ctx->cc_pending);
- ctx->cc_sector += sector_step;
- tag_offset++;
- cond_resched();
- continue;
- /*
- * There was a data integrity error.
- */
- case -EBADMSG:
- atomic_dec(&ctx->cc_pending);
- return BLK_STS_PROTECTION;
- /*
- * There was an error while processing the request.
- */
- default:
- atomic_dec(&ctx->cc_pending);
- return BLK_STS_IOERR;
- }
+ dmreq->sg_in = kcalloc(nents, sizeof(struct scatterlist), GFP_KERNEL);
+ dmreq->sg_out = kcalloc(nents, sizeof(struct scatterlist), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dmreq->sg_in || !dmreq->sg_out) {
+ DMERR("dm-crypt: Failed to allocate scatterlist\n");
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ dmreq->ctx = ctx;
+
+ sg_init_table(dmreq->sg_in, nents);
+ sg_init_table(dmreq->sg_out, nents);
+
+ while (ctx->iter_in.bi_size && ctx->iter_out.bi_size && i < nents) {
+ bv_in = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_in, ctx->iter_in);
+ bv_out = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_out, ctx->iter_out);
+
+ sg_set_page(&dmreq->sg_in[i], bv_in.bv_page, bv_in.bv_len,
+ bv_in.bv_offset);
+ sg_set_page(&dmreq->sg_out[i], bv_out.bv_page, bv_out.bv_len,
+ bv_out.bv_offset);
+
+ bio_advance_iter(ctx->bio_in, &ctx->iter_in, bv_in.bv_len);
+ bio_advance_iter(ctx->bio_out, &ctx->iter_out, bv_out.bv_len);
+
+ bytes += bv_in.bv_len;
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ DMDEBUG("dm-crypt: Processed %u of %u bytes\n", bytes, cryptlen);
+
+ rinfo.cc_sector = ctx->cc_sector;
+ rinfo.nents = nents;
+ rinfo.integrity_metadata = io->integrity_metadata;
+
+ atomic_inc(&ctx->cc_pending);
+ if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req_aead, dmreq->sg_in, dmreq->sg_out,
+ bytes, (u8 *)&rinfo);
+ if (bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) == WRITE)
+ r = crypto_aead_encrypt(req_aead);
+ else
+ r = crypto_aead_decrypt(req_aead);
+ } else {
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, dmreq->sg_in, dmreq->sg_out,
+ bytes, (u8 *)&rinfo);
+ if (bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) == WRITE)
+ r = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+ else
+ r = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
}
+ switch (r) {
+ /* The request was queued so wait. */
+ case -EBUSY:
+ wait_for_completion(&ctx->restart);
+ reinit_completion(&ctx->restart);
+ /* fall through */
+ /*
+ * The request is queued and processed asynchronously,
+ * completion function kcryptd_async_done() is called.
+ */
+ case -EINPROGRESS:
+ ctx->r.req = NULL;
+ cond_resched();
+ break;
+ /*
+ * The requeest was already processed (synchronously).
+ */
+ case 0:
+ atomic_dec(&ctx->cc_pending);
+ break;
+ /*
+ * There was a data integrity error.
+ */
+ case -EBADMSG:
+ atomic_dec(&ctx->cc_pending);
+ return BLK_STS_PROTECTION;
+ /*
+ * There was an error while processing the request.
+ */
+ default:
+ atomic_dec(&ctx->cc_pending);
+ return BLK_STS_IOERR;
+ }
+end:
return 0;
}
@@ -1483,14 +614,24 @@ static void crypt_dec_pending(struct dm_crypt_io *io)
{
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
struct bio *base_bio = io->base_bio;
+ struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq;
blk_status_t error = io->error;
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&io->io_pending))
return;
- if (io->ctx.r.req)
+ if (io->ctx.r.req) {
crypt_free_req(cc, io->ctx.r.req, base_bio);
+ if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
+ dmreq = dmreq_of_req(cc, io->ctx.r.req_aead);
+ else
+ dmreq = dmreq_of_req(cc, io->ctx.r.req);
+ DMDEBUG("dm-crypt: Freeing scatterlists [sync]\n");
+ kfree(dmreq->sg_in);
+ kfree(dmreq->sg_out);
+ }
+
if (unlikely(io->integrity_metadata_from_pool))
mempool_free(io->integrity_metadata, &io->cc->tag_pool);
else
@@ -1737,7 +878,7 @@ static void kcryptd_crypt_write_convert(struct dm_crypt_io *io)
sector += bio_sectors(clone);
crypt_inc_pending(io);
- r = crypt_convert(cc, &io->ctx);
+ r = crypt_convert_bio(cc, &io->ctx);
if (r)
io->error = r;
crypt_finished = atomic_dec_and_test(&io->ctx.cc_pending);
@@ -1767,7 +908,7 @@ static void kcryptd_crypt_read_convert(struct dm_crypt_io *io)
crypt_convert_init(cc, &io->ctx, io->base_bio, io->base_bio,
io->sector);
- r = crypt_convert(cc, &io->ctx);
+ r = crypt_convert_bio(cc, &io->ctx);
if (r)
io->error = r;
@@ -1795,16 +936,16 @@ static void kcryptd_async_done(struct crypto_async_request *async_req,
return;
}
- if (!error && cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->post)
- error = cc->iv_gen_ops->post(cc, org_iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq), dmreq);
-
if (error == -EBADMSG) {
- DMERR_LIMIT("INTEGRITY AEAD ERROR, sector %llu",
- (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(*org_sector_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq)));
+ DMERR("INTEGRITY AEAD ERROR\n");
io->error = BLK_STS_PROTECTION;
} else if (error < 0)
io->error = BLK_STS_IOERR;
+ DMDEBUG("dm-crypt: Freeing scatterlists and request struct [async]\n");
+ kfree(dmreq->sg_in);
+ kfree(dmreq->sg_out);
+
crypt_free_req(cc, req_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq), io->base_bio);
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->cc_pending))
@@ -1834,163 +975,78 @@ static void kcryptd_queue_crypt(struct dm_crypt_io *io)
queue_work(cc->crypt_queue, &io->work);
}
-static void crypt_free_tfms_aead(struct crypt_config *cc)
+static void crypt_free_tfm(struct crypt_config *cc)
{
- if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead)
- return;
-
- if (cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0] && !IS_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0])) {
- crypto_free_aead(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0]);
- cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0] = NULL;
- }
-
- kfree(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead);
- cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead = NULL;
-}
-
-static void crypt_free_tfms_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- unsigned i;
-
- if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfms)
- return;
-
- for (i = 0; i < cc->tfms_count; i++)
- if (cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i] && !IS_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i])) {
- crypto_free_skcipher(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i]);
- cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i] = NULL;
+ if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
+ if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfm_aead)
+ return;
+ if (cc->cipher_tfm.tfm_aead && !IS_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfm_aead)) {
+ crypto_free_aead(cc->cipher_tfm.tfm_aead);
+ cc->cipher_tfm.tfm_aead = NULL;
}
-
- kfree(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms);
- cc->cipher_tfm.tfms = NULL;
-}
-
-static void crypt_free_tfms(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
- crypt_free_tfms_aead(cc);
- else
- crypt_free_tfms_skcipher(cc);
-}
-
-static int crypt_alloc_tfms_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc, char *ciphermode)
-{
- unsigned i;
- int err;
-
- cc->cipher_tfm.tfms = kcalloc(cc->tfms_count,
- sizeof(struct crypto_skcipher *),
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfms)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- for (i = 0; i < cc->tfms_count; i++) {
- cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i] = crypto_alloc_skcipher(ciphermode, 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i])) {
- err = PTR_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i]);
- crypt_free_tfms(cc);
- return err;
+ } else {
+ if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfm)
+ return;
+ if (cc->cipher_tfm.tfm && !IS_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfm)) {
+ crypto_free_skcipher(cc->cipher_tfm.tfm);
+ cc->cipher_tfm.tfm = NULL;
}
}
-
- return 0;
}
-static int crypt_alloc_tfms_aead(struct crypt_config *cc, char *ciphermode)
+static int crypt_alloc_tfm(struct crypt_config *cc, char *ciphermode)
{
int err;
- cc->cipher_tfm.tfms = kmalloc(sizeof(struct crypto_aead *), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfms)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0] = crypto_alloc_aead(ciphermode, 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0])) {
- err = PTR_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0]);
- crypt_free_tfms(cc);
- return err;
+ if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
+ cc->cipher_tfm.tfm_aead = crypto_alloc_aead(ciphermode, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfm_aead)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfm_aead);
+ crypt_free_tfm(cc);
+ return err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ cc->cipher_tfm.tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(ciphermode, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfm);
+ crypt_free_tfm(cc);
+ return err;
+ }
}
return 0;
}
-static int crypt_alloc_tfms(struct crypt_config *cc, char *ciphermode)
-{
- if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
- return crypt_alloc_tfms_aead(cc, ciphermode);
- else
- return crypt_alloc_tfms_skcipher(cc, ciphermode);
-}
-
-static unsigned crypt_subkey_size(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- return (cc->key_size - cc->key_extra_size) >> ilog2(cc->tfms_count);
-}
-
-static unsigned crypt_authenckey_size(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- return crypt_subkey_size(cc) + RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct crypto_authenc_key_param));
-}
-
-/*
- * If AEAD is composed like authenc(hmac(sha256),xts(aes)),
- * the key must be for some reason in special format.
- * This funcion converts cc->key to this special format.
- */
-static void crypt_copy_authenckey(char *p, const void *key,
- unsigned enckeylen, unsigned authkeylen)
+static void init_key_info(struct crypt_config *cc, enum setkey_op keyop,
+ char *ivopts, struct geniv_key_info *kinfo)
{
- struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
- struct rtattr *rta;
-
- rta = (struct rtattr *)p;
- param = RTA_DATA(rta);
- param->enckeylen = cpu_to_be32(enckeylen);
- rta->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(*param));
- rta->rta_type = CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM;
- p += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*param));
- memcpy(p, key + enckeylen, authkeylen);
- p += authkeylen;
- memcpy(p, key, enckeylen);
+ kinfo->keyop = keyop;
+ kinfo->tfms_count = cc->tfms_count;
+ kinfo->key = cc->key;
+ kinfo->cipher_flags = cc->cipher_flags;
+ kinfo->ivopts = ivopts;
+ kinfo->iv_offset = cc->iv_offset;
+ kinfo->sector_size = cc->sector_size;
+ kinfo->key_size = cc->key_size;
+ kinfo->key_parts = cc->key_parts;
+ kinfo->key_mac_size = cc->key_mac_size;
+ kinfo->on_disk_tag_size = cc->on_disk_tag_size;
}
-static int crypt_setkey(struct crypt_config *cc)
+static int crypt_setkey(struct crypt_config *cc, enum setkey_op keyop,
+ char *ivopts)
{
- unsigned subkey_size;
- int err = 0, i, r;
-
- /* Ignore extra keys (which are used for IV etc) */
- subkey_size = crypt_subkey_size(cc);
-
- if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) {
- if (subkey_size < cc->key_mac_size)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- crypt_copy_authenckey(cc->authenc_key, cc->key,
- subkey_size - cc->key_mac_size,
- cc->key_mac_size);
- }
+ int r = 0;
+ struct geniv_key_info kinfo;
- for (i = 0; i < cc->tfms_count; i++) {
- if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc))
- r = crypto_aead_setkey(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[i],
- cc->authenc_key, crypt_authenckey_size(cc));
- else if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
- r = crypto_aead_setkey(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[i],
- cc->key + (i * subkey_size),
- subkey_size);
- else
- r = crypto_skcipher_setkey(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i],
- cc->key + (i * subkey_size),
- subkey_size);
- if (r)
- err = r;
- }
+ init_key_info(cc, keyop, ivopts, &kinfo);
- if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc))
- memzero_explicit(cc->authenc_key, crypt_authenckey_size(cc));
+ if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
+ r = crypto_aead_setkey(cc->cipher_tfm.tfm_aead, (u8 *)&kinfo, sizeof(kinfo));
+ else
+ r = crypto_skcipher_setkey(cc->cipher_tfm.tfm, (u8 *)&kinfo, sizeof(kinfo));
- return err;
+ return r;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
@@ -2003,7 +1059,9 @@ static bool contains_whitespace(const char *str)
return false;
}
-static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string)
+static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc,
+ const char *key_string,
+ enum setkey_op keyop, char *ivopts)
{
char *new_key_string, *key_desc;
int ret;
@@ -2064,7 +1122,7 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string
/* clear the flag since following operations may invalidate previously valid key */
clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
- ret = crypt_setkey(cc);
+ ret = crypt_setkey(cc, keyop, ivopts);
if (!ret) {
set_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
@@ -2101,7 +1159,9 @@ static int get_key_size(char **key_string)
#else
-static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string)
+static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc,
+ const char *key_string,
+ enum setkey_op keyop, char *ivopts)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -2113,7 +1173,8 @@ static int get_key_size(char **key_string)
#endif
-static int crypt_set_key(struct crypt_config *cc, char *key)
+static int crypt_set_key(struct crypt_config *cc, enum setkey_op keyop,
+ char *key, char *ivopts)
{
int r = -EINVAL;
int key_string_len = strlen(key);
@@ -2124,7 +1185,7 @@ static int crypt_set_key(struct crypt_config *cc, char *key)
/* ':' means the key is in kernel keyring, short-circuit normal key processing */
if (key[0] == ':') {
- r = crypt_set_keyring_key(cc, key + 1);
+ r = crypt_set_keyring_key(cc, key + 1, keyop, ivopts);
goto out;
}
@@ -2139,7 +1200,7 @@ static int crypt_set_key(struct crypt_config *cc, char *key)
if (cc->key_size && hex2bin(cc->key, key, cc->key_size) < 0)
goto out;
- r = crypt_setkey(cc);
+ r = crypt_setkey(cc, keyop, ivopts);
if (!r)
set_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
@@ -2150,6 +1211,17 @@ static int crypt_set_key(struct crypt_config *cc, char *key)
return r;
}
+static int crypt_init_key(struct dm_target *ti, char *key, char *ivopts)
+{
+ struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = crypt_set_key(cc, SETKEY_OP_INIT, key, ivopts);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ ti->error = "Error decoding and setting key";
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int crypt_wipe_key(struct crypt_config *cc)
{
int r;
@@ -2158,7 +1230,7 @@ static int crypt_wipe_key(struct crypt_config *cc)
get_random_bytes(&cc->key, cc->key_size);
kzfree(cc->key_string);
cc->key_string = NULL;
- r = crypt_setkey(cc);
+ r = crypt_setkey(cc, SETKEY_OP_WIPE, NULL);
memset(&cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
return r;
@@ -2218,7 +1290,7 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
if (cc->crypt_queue)
destroy_workqueue(cc->crypt_queue);
- crypt_free_tfms(cc);
+ crypt_free_tfm(cc);
bioset_exit(&cc->bs);
@@ -2229,17 +1301,12 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
WARN_ON(percpu_counter_sum(&cc->n_allocated_pages) != 0);
percpu_counter_destroy(&cc->n_allocated_pages);
- if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr)
- cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr(cc);
-
if (cc->dev)
dm_put_device(ti, cc->dev);
- kzfree(cc->cipher);
kzfree(cc->cipher_string);
kzfree(cc->key_string);
kzfree(cc->cipher_auth);
- kzfree(cc->authenc_key);
mutex_destroy(&cc->bio_alloc_lock);
@@ -2253,6 +1320,32 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
spin_unlock(&dm_crypt_clients_lock);
}
+static int get_iv_size_by_name(struct crypt_config *cc, char *alg_name)
+{
+ unsigned int iv_size;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm_aead;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
+
+ if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
+ tfm_aead = crypto_alloc_aead(alg_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm_aead))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm_aead);
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm_aead);
+ } else {
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
+ }
+
+ return iv_size;
+
+}
+
static int crypt_ctr_ivmode(struct dm_target *ti, const char *ivmode)
{
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
@@ -2266,97 +1359,12 @@ static int crypt_ctr_ivmode(struct dm_target *ti, const char *ivmode)
/* at least a 64 bit sector number should fit in our buffer */
cc->iv_size = max(cc->iv_size,
(unsigned int)(sizeof(u64) / sizeof(u8)));
- else if (ivmode) {
- DMWARN("Selected cipher does not support IVs");
- ivmode = NULL;
- }
-
- /* Choose ivmode, see comments at iv code. */
- if (ivmode == NULL)
- cc->iv_gen_ops = NULL;
- else if (strcmp(ivmode, "plain") == 0)
- cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_plain_ops;
- else if (strcmp(ivmode, "plain64") == 0)
- cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_plain64_ops;
- else if (strcmp(ivmode, "plain64be") == 0)
- cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_plain64be_ops;
- else if (strcmp(ivmode, "essiv") == 0)
- cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_essiv_ops;
- else if (strcmp(ivmode, "benbi") == 0)
- cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_benbi_ops;
- else if (strcmp(ivmode, "null") == 0)
- cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_null_ops;
- else if (strcmp(ivmode, "lmk") == 0) {
- cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_lmk_ops;
- /*
- * Version 2 and 3 is recognised according
- * to length of provided multi-key string.
- * If present (version 3), last key is used as IV seed.
- * All keys (including IV seed) are always the same size.
- */
- if (cc->key_size % cc->key_parts) {
- cc->key_parts++;
- cc->key_extra_size = cc->key_size / cc->key_parts;
- }
- } else if (strcmp(ivmode, "tcw") == 0) {
- cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_tcw_ops;
- cc->key_parts += 2; /* IV + whitening */
- cc->key_extra_size = cc->iv_size + TCW_WHITENING_SIZE;
- } else if (strcmp(ivmode, "random") == 0) {
- cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_random_ops;
+
+ if (strcmp(ivmode, "random") == 0) {
/* Need storage space in integrity fields. */
cc->integrity_iv_size = cc->iv_size;
- } else {
- ti->error = "Invalid IV mode";
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Workaround to parse cipher algorithm from crypto API spec.
- * The cc->cipher is currently used only in ESSIV.
- * This should be probably done by crypto-api calls (once available...)
- */
-static int crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
- const char *alg_name = NULL;
- char *start, *end;
-
- if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
- alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(any_tfm_aead(cc)));
- if (!alg_name)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) {
- alg_name = strchr(alg_name, ',');
- if (!alg_name)
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- alg_name++;
- } else {
- alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(any_tfm(cc)));
- if (!alg_name)
- return -EINVAL;
}
- start = strchr(alg_name, '(');
- end = strchr(alg_name, ')');
-
- if (!start && !end) {
- cc->cipher = kstrdup(alg_name, GFP_KERNEL);
- return cc->cipher ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- if (!start || !end || ++start >= end)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- cc->cipher = kzalloc(end - start + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cc->cipher)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- strncpy(cc->cipher, start, end - start);
-
return 0;
}
@@ -2392,10 +1400,6 @@ static int crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc, char *cipher_api)
cc->key_mac_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(mac);
crypto_free_ahash(mac);
- cc->authenc_key = kmalloc(crypt_authenckey_size(cc), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cc->authenc_key)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
return 0;
}
@@ -2404,6 +1408,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
{
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
char *tmp, *cipher_api;
+ char cipher_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
int ret = -EINVAL;
cc->tfms_count = 1;
@@ -2422,8 +1427,29 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
+ if (!*ivmode)
+ *ivmode = "null";
+
+ /*
+ * For those ciphers which do not support IVs, but input ivmode is not
+ * NULL, use "null" as ivmode compulsively.
+ */
+ cc->iv_size = get_iv_size_by_name(cc, cipher_api);
+ if (cc->iv_size < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!cc->iv_size && ivmode) {
+ DMWARN("Selected cipher does not support IVs");
+ *ivmode = "null";
+ }
+
/* Allocate cipher */
- ret = crypt_alloc_tfms(cc, cipher_api);
+ ret = snprintf(cipher_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s(%s)",
+ *ivmode, cipher_api);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher strings";
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ ret = crypt_alloc_tfm(cc, cipher_name);
if (ret < 0) {
ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm";
return ret;
@@ -2440,12 +1466,6 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
} else
cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
- ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc);
- if (ret < 0) {
- ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
return 0;
}
@@ -2480,10 +1500,6 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
}
cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
- cc->cipher = kstrdup(cipher, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cc->cipher)
- goto bad_mem;
-
chainmode = strsep(&tmp, "-");
*ivopts = strsep(&tmp, "-");
*ivmode = strsep(&*ivopts, ":");
@@ -2509,15 +1525,35 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
if (!cipher_api)
goto bad_mem;
+ /* For those ciphers which do not support IVs,
+ * use the 'null' template cipher
+ */
+ if (!*ivmode)
+ *ivmode = "null";
+
+ /*
+ * For those ciphers which do not support IVs, but input ivmode is not
+ * NULL, use "null" as ivmode compulsively.
+ */
ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
+ cc->iv_size = get_iv_size_by_name(cc, cipher_api);
+ if (cc->iv_size < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!cc->iv_size && ivmode) {
+ DMWARN("Selected cipher does not support IVs");
+ *ivmode = "null";
+ }
+
+ ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "%s(%s(%s))", *ivmode, chainmode, cipher);
if (ret < 0) {
kfree(cipher_api);
goto bad_mem;
}
/* Allocate cipher */
- ret = crypt_alloc_tfms(cc, cipher_api);
+ ret = crypt_alloc_tfm(cc, cipher_api);
if (ret < 0) {
ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm";
kfree(cipher_api);
@@ -2556,30 +1592,12 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key)
return ret;
/* Initialize and set key */
- ret = crypt_set_key(cc, key);
+ ret = crypt_init_key(ti, key, ivopts);
if (ret < 0) {
ti->error = "Error decoding and setting key";
return ret;
}
- /* Allocate IV */
- if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->ctr) {
- ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->ctr(cc, ti, ivopts);
- if (ret < 0) {
- ti->error = "Error creating IV";
- return ret;
- }
- }
-
- /* Initialize IV (set keys for ESSIV etc) */
- if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->init) {
- ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->init(cc);
- if (ret < 0) {
- ti->error = "Error initialising IV";
- return ret;
- }
- }
-
/* wipe the kernel key payload copy */
if (cc->key_string)
memset(cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
@@ -2673,7 +1691,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
unsigned int align_mask;
unsigned long long tmpll;
int ret;
- size_t iv_size_padding, additional_req_size;
+ size_t additional_req_size;
char dummy;
if (argc < 5) {
@@ -2729,25 +1747,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
}
cc->dmreq_start = ALIGN(cc->dmreq_start, __alignof__(struct dm_crypt_request));
- if (align_mask < CRYPTO_MINALIGN) {
- /* Allocate the padding exactly */
- iv_size_padding = -(cc->dmreq_start + sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request))
- & align_mask;
- } else {
- /*
- * If the cipher requires greater alignment than kmalloc
- * alignment, we don't know the exact position of the
- * initialization vector. We must assume worst case.
- */
- iv_size_padding = align_mask;
- }
-
- /* ...| IV + padding | original IV | original sec. number | bio tag offset | */
- additional_req_size = sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request) +
- iv_size_padding + cc->iv_size +
- cc->iv_size +
- sizeof(uint64_t) +
- sizeof(unsigned int);
+ additional_req_size = sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request);
ret = mempool_init_kmalloc_pool(&cc->req_pool, MIN_IOS, cc->dmreq_start + additional_req_size);
if (ret) {
@@ -3024,22 +2024,13 @@ static int crypt_message(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv,
return -EINVAL;
}
- ret = crypt_set_key(cc, argv[2]);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->init)
- ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->init(cc);
+ ret = crypt_set_key(cc, SETKEY_OP_SET, argv[2], NULL);
/* wipe the kernel key payload copy */
if (cc->key_string)
memset(cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
return ret;
}
if (argc == 2 && !strcasecmp(argv[1], "wipe")) {
- if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe) {
- ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe(cc);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- }
return crypt_wipe_key(cc);
}
}
@@ -3078,7 +2069,7 @@ static void crypt_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *limits)
static struct target_type crypt_target = {
.name = "crypt",
- .version = {1, 18, 1},
+ .version = {1, 19, 1},
.module = THIS_MODULE,
.ctr = crypt_ctr,
.dtr = crypt_dtr,
@@ -3103,7 +2094,7 @@ static int __init dm_crypt_init(void)
return r;
}
-static void __exit dm_crypt_exit(void)
+void __exit dm_crypt_exit(void)
{
dm_unregister_target(&crypt_target);
}
--
1.7.12.4
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