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Message-ID: <DU2PR04MB863008D8958A5F7599C88949951D9@DU2PR04MB8630.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2022 10:46:07 +0000
From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>
To: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
CC: "kernel@...gutronix.de" <kernel@...gutronix.de>,
David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>,
"tharvey@...eworks.com" <tharvey@...eworks.com>,
Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@...tq-group.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@....com>,
Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@....com>,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>,
"keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [EXT] [PATCH v6 4/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
CAAM-based trusted keys
Hi Ahmad,
Please find the comments in-line.
Regards
Pankaj
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
> Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2022 10:14 PM
> To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>; David Howells
> <dhowells@...hat.com>; Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>; James
> Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>; Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> Cc: kernel@...gutronix.de; David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>; Pankaj
> Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>; tharvey@...eworks.com; Matthias
> Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@...tq-group.com>; Ahmad Fatoum
> <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>; James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>; Serge E.
> Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>; Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@....com>; Aymen
> Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>; Herbert Xu
> <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>; David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>;
> Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>; Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>;
> Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>; Franck Lenormand
> <franck.lenormand@....com>; Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>;
> keyrings@...r.kernel.org; linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org; linux-
> doc@...r.kernel.org; linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org; linux-
> kernel@...r.kernel.org; linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
> Subject: [EXT] [PATCH v6 4/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP
> CAAM-based trusted keys
>
> Caution: EXT Email
>
> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
>
> The CAAM does crypto acceleration, hardware number generation and has a
> blob mechanism for encapsulation/decapsulation of sensitive material.
>
> This blob mechanism depends on a device specific random 256-bit One Time
> Programmable Master Key that is fused in each SoC at manufacturing time.
> This key is unreadable and can only be used by the CAAM for AES
> encryption/decryption of user data.
>
> This makes it a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys.
>
> Previous commits generalized trusted keys to support multiple backends and
> added an API to access the CAAM blob mechanism. Based on these, provide
> the necessary glue to use the CAAM for trusted keys.
>
> Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>
> Tested-By: Tim Harvey <tharvey@...eworks.com>
> Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@...tq-group.com>
> Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
> ---
> v5 -> v6:
> - Rename caam_trusted_key_ops to trusted_key_caam_ops for symmetry
> with other trust sources (Pankaj)
> - collected Pankaj's Reviewed-by
> v4 -> v5:
> - Collected Reviewed-by's and Tested-by's
> - Changed modifier to SECURE_KEY for compatibility with linux-imx
> (Matthias)
> v3 -> v4:
> - Collected Acked-by's, Reviewed-by's and Tested-by
> v2 -> v3:
> - add MAINTAINERS entry
> v1 -> v2:
> - Extend trusted keys documentation for CAAM
>
> To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
> To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
> To: James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
> Cc: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@....com>
> Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
> Cc: Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>
> Cc: David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
> Cc: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@....com>
> Cc: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@...tq-group.com>
> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> Cc: keyrings@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
> ---
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 1 +
> .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 40 +++++++++-
> MAINTAINERS | 9 +++
> include/keys/trusted_caam.h | 11 +++
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 11 ++-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 +
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 6 +-
> 8 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644
> include/keys/trusted_caam.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-
> keys/trusted_caam.c
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 844c883ca9d8..9e7ef4c6585d 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -5875,6 +5875,7 @@
> sources:
> - "tpm"
> - "tee"
> + - "caam"
> If not specified then it defaults to iterating through
> the trust source list starting with TPM and assigns the
> first trust source as a backend which is initialized diff --git
> a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> index 99cf34d7c025..ed60c48cb692 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> @@ -35,6 +35,13 @@ safe.
> Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-
> chip
> fuses and is accessible to TEE only.
>
> + (3) CAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on
> + NXP SoCs)
> +
> + When High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure
> + mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key
> + randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time.
> + Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead.
> +
> * Execution isolation
>
> (1) TPM
> @@ -46,6 +53,10 @@ safe.
> Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution
> environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process.
>
> + (3) CAAM
> +
> + Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.
> +
> * Optional binding to platform integrity state
>
> (1) TPM
> @@ -63,6 +74,11 @@ safe.
> Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
> be extended with TEE based measured boot process.
>
> + (3) CAAM
> +
> + Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
> + for platform integrity.
> +
> * Interfaces and APIs
>
> (1) TPM
> @@ -74,10 +90,13 @@ safe.
> TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For
> more details refer to ``Documentation/staging/tee.rst``.
>
> + (3) CAAM
> +
> + Interface is specific to silicon vendor.
>
> * Threat model
>
> - The strength and appropriateness of a particular TPM or TEE for a given
> + The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for
> + a given
> purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant
> data.
>
>
> @@ -104,6 +123,12 @@ selected trust source:
> from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna
> CSPRNG
> which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources.
>
> + * CAAM: Kernel RNG
> +
> + The normal kernel random number generator is used. To seed it from the
> + CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure
> the device
> + is probed.
> +
> Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel
> command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number
> pool.
>
> @@ -192,6 +217,19 @@ Usage::
> specific to TEE device implementation. The key length for new keys is always
> in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
>
> +Trusted Keys usage: CAAM
> +------------------------
> +
> +Usage::
> +
> + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
> + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
> + keyctl print keyid
> +
> +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in
> +format specific to CAAM device implementation. The key length for new
> +keys is always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
> +
> Encrypted Keys usage
> --------------------
>
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index 05fd080b82f3..f13382a14967 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -10647,6 +10647,15 @@ S: Supported
> F: include/keys/trusted_tee.h
> F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
>
> +KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM
> +M: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>
> +R: Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@...gutronix.de>
> +L: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
> +L: keyrings@...r.kernel.org
> +S: Maintained
> +F: include/keys/trusted_caam.h
> +F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
> +
> KEYS/KEYRINGS
> M: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> M: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_caam.h b/include/keys/trusted_caam.h
> new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..73fe2f32f65e
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_caam.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum <kernel@...gutronix.de>
> +*/
> +
> +#ifndef __CAAM_TRUSTED_KEY_H
> +#define __CAAM_TRUSTED_KEY_H
> +
> +extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_caam_ops;
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-
> keys/Kconfig
> index fc4abd581abb..dbfdd8536468 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
> @@ -24,6 +24,15 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE
> Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted
> key backend.
>
> -if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE
> +config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
> + bool "CAAM-based trusted keys"
> + depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS
> + select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN
> + default y
> + help
> + Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module
> + (CAAM) as trusted key backend.
> +
> +if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE
> && !TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
> comment "No trust source selected!"
> endif
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-
> keys/Makefile
> index 2e2371eae4d5..735aa0bc08ef 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> @@ -12,3 +12,5 @@ trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) +=
> trusted_tpm2.o
> trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o
>
> trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o
> +
> +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) += trusted_caam.o
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
> b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..5457c76c6602
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2021 Pengutronix, Ahmad Fatoum <kernel@...gutronix.de>
> +*/
> +
> +#include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
> +#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
> +#include <linux/build_bug.h>
> +#include <linux/key-type.h>
> +#include <soc/fsl/caam-blob.h>
> +
> +static struct caam_blob_priv *blobifier;
> +
> +#define KEYMOD "SECURE_KEY"
> +
> +static_assert(MAX_KEY_SIZE + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD <=
> CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN);
> +static_assert(MAX_BLOB_SIZE <= CAAM_BLOB_MAX_LEN);
> +
> +static int trusted_caam_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char
> +*datablob) {
If the structure "struct keyblob_info", is used in patch 3/4, then below use for CAAM specific macros
will not be needed to be set in this file/function.
> + int length = p->key_len + CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD;
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = caam_encap_blob(blobifier, KEYMOD, p->key, p->blob, length);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
If the structure "struct keyblob_info", is used in patch 3/4, then below line of code will not be needed.
> + p->blob_len = length;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int trusted_caam_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char
> +*datablob) {
> + int length = p->blob_len;
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = caam_decap_blob(blobifier, KEYMOD, p->blob, p->key, length);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
If the structure "struct keyblob_info", is used in patch 3/4, then below line of code will not be needed.
> + p->key_len = length - CAAM_BLOB_OVERHEAD;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int trusted_caam_init(void)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + blobifier = caam_blob_gen_init();
> + if (IS_ERR(blobifier)) {
> + pr_err("Job Ring Device allocation for transform failed\n");
> + return PTR_ERR(blobifier);
> + }
> +
> + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
> + if (ret)
> + caam_blob_gen_exit(blobifier);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static void trusted_caam_exit(void)
> +{
> + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
> + caam_blob_gen_exit(blobifier);
> +}
> +
> +struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_caam_ops = {
> + .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
> + .init = trusted_caam_init,
> + .seal = trusted_caam_seal,
> + .unseal = trusted_caam_unseal,
> + .exit = trusted_caam_exit,
> +};
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> index 9235fb7d0ec9..c6fc50d67214 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
> #include <keys/user-type.h>
> #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
> #include <keys/trusted_tee.h>
> +#include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
> #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
> #include <linux/capability.h>
> #include <linux/err.h>
> @@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG");
>
> static char *trusted_key_source;
> module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); -
> MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm or tee)");
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or
> +caam)");
>
> static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if
> defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) @@ -38,6 +39,9 @@ static const
> struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if
> defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE)
> { "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops }, #endif
> +#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM)
> + { "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops }, #endif
> };
>
> DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init,
> *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init);
> --
> 2.30.2
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