linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v11 3/4] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

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Message-ID: <878rjlr85s.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com>
Date:   Mon, 05 Dec 2022 19:56:47 +0100
From:   Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To:     "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, patches@...ts.linux.dev,
        tglx@...utronix.de, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org>,
        Carlos O'Donell <carlos@...hat.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 3/4] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom()
 implementation

* Jason A. Donenfeld:

> +retry_generation:
> +	/*
> +	 * @rng_info->generation must always be read here, as it serializes @state->key with the
> +	 * kernel's RNG reseeding schedule.
> +	 */
> +	current_generation = READ_ONCE(rng_info->generation);

> +		if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(state->generation) != READ_ONCE(rng_info-

I'm pretty sure you need some sort of barrier here.  We have a similar
TM-lite construct in glibc ld.so for locating link maps by address, and
there the compiler performed reordering.

  _dl_find_object miscompilation on powerpc64le
  <https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=28745>

I'm not familiar with READ_ONCE, but Documentation/atomic_t.txt suggests
it's a “regular LOAD”, and include/asm-generic/rwonce.h concurs.
Likewise, the signal safety mechanism needs compiler barriers (signal
fences).

I'm also not sure how READ_ONCE realizes atomic 64-bit reads on 32-bit
platforms.  i386 can do them in user space via the FPU worst-case (if
the control word hasn't been corrupted).  CMPXCHG8B is not applicable
here because it's a read-only mapping.  Maybe add a comment at least
about that “strong prevailing wind”?

Thanks,
Florian