linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 13/33] kmsan: Introduce memset_no_sanitize

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Message-ID: <CAG_fn=Vaj3hTRAMxUwofpSMPhFBOizDOWR_An-V9qLNQv-suYw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 8 Dec 2023 14:48:55 +0100
From:   Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
To:     Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Heiko Carstens <hca@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
        Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@...il.com>,
        kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>,
        Sven Schnelle <svens@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/33] kmsan: Introduce memset_no_sanitize_memory()

On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 11:06 PM Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> Add a wrapper for memset() that prevents unpoisoning.

We have __memset() already, won't it work for this case?
On the other hand, I am not sure you want to preserve the redzone in
its previous state (unless it's known to be poisoned).
You might consider explicitly unpoisoning the redzone instead.

...

> +__no_sanitize_memory
> +static inline void *memset_no_sanitize_memory(void *s, int c, size_t n)
> +{
> +       return memset(s, c, n);
> +}

I think depending on the compiler optimizations this might end up
being a call to normal memset, that would still change the shadow
bytes.