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Message-ID: <46dd8990-df35-5044-7ab3-e1acb04de85f@huawei.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2024 09:35:21 +0800
From: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@...wei.com>
To: "Russell King (Oracle)" <linux@...linux.org.uk>
CC: <ardb@...nel.org>, <arnd@...db.de>, <afd@...com>,
<akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, <linus.walleij@...aro.org>,
<eric.devolder@...cle.com>, <robh@...nel.org>, <kees@...nel.org>,
<masahiroy@...nel.org>, <palmer@...osinc.com>, <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
<xiao.w.wang@...el.com>, <alexghiti@...osinc.com>, <nathan@...nel.org>,
<jan.kiszka@...mens.com>, <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] ARM: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin
On 2024/8/2 19:47, Russell King (Oracle) wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 10:53:10AM +0800, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
>> Gentle ping.
>>
>> On 2024/6/24 10:36, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
>>> Add the STACKLEAK gcc plugin to arm32 by adding the helper used by
>>> stackleak common code: on_thread_stack(). It initialize the stack with the
>>> poison value before returning from system calls which improves the kernel
>>> security. Additionally, this disables the plugin in EFI stub code and
>>> decompress code, which are out of scope for the protection.
>>>
>>> Before the test on Qemu versatilepb board:
>>> # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
>>> lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
>>> lkdtm: XFAIL: stackleak is not supported on this arch (HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK=n)
>>>
>>> After:
>>> # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
>>> lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
>>> lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
>>> high offset: 80 bytes
>>> current: 280 bytes
>>> lowest: 696 bytes
>>> tracked: 696 bytes
>>> untracked: 192 bytes
>>> poisoned: 7220 bytes
>>> low offset: 4 bytes
>>> lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@...wei.com>
>>> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
>
> Is this a feature that you have a use case for?
Yes, We have ARM32 products internally, and there is a need for security
hardening.
>
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