linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v13 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests

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Message-ID: <c0596432-a20c-4cb7-8eb4-f8f23a1ec24b@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 11:25:54 +0800
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 thomas.lendacky@....com, bp@...en8.de, x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: mingo@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
 pgonda@...gle.com, seanjc@...gle.com, pbonzini@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC
 enabled guests

On 10/21/2024 1:51 PM, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> Secure TSC enabled guests should not write to MSR_IA32_TSC(10H) register as
> the subsequent TSC value reads are undefined. MSR_IA32_TSC read/write
> accesses should not exit to the hypervisor for such guests.
> 
> Accesses to MSR_IA32_TSC needs special handling in the #VC handler for the
> guests with Secure TSC enabled. Writes to MSR_IA32_TSC should be ignored,
> and reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the result of the RDTSC
> instruction.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> index 965209067f03..2ad7773458c0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
> @@ -1308,6 +1308,30 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
>   		return ES_OK;
>   	}
>   
> +	/*
> +	 * TSC related accesses should not exit to the hypervisor when a
> +	 * guest is executing with SecureTSC enabled, so special handling
> +	 * is required for accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC:
> +	 *
> +	 * Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads
> +	 *         of the TSC to return undefined values, so ignore all
> +	 *         writes.
> +	 * Reads:  Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC
> +	 *         value, use the value returned by RDTSC.
> +	 */

Why doesn't handle it by returning ES_VMM_ERROR when hypervisor 
intercepts RD/WR of MSR_IA32_TSC? With SECURE_TSC enabled, it seems not 
need to be intercepted.

I think the reason is that SNP guest relies on interception to do the 
ignore behavior for WRMSR in #VC handler because the writing leads to 
undefined result. Then the question is what if the hypervisor doesn't 
intercept write to MSR_IA32_TSC in the first place?

> +	if (regs->cx == MSR_IA32_TSC && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC)) {
> +		u64 tsc;
> +
> +		if (exit_info_1)
> +			return ES_OK;
> +
> +		tsc = rdtsc();
> +		regs->ax = UINT_MAX & tsc;
> +		regs->dx = UINT_MAX & (tsc >> 32);
> +
> +		return ES_OK;
> +	}
> +
>   	ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
>   	if (exit_info_1) {
>   		ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, regs->ax);