linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v13 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests

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Message-ID: <33300e68-dde5-0456-2a6d-4fb585d188a6@amd.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2024 11:54:20 +0530
From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@....com>
To: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 thomas.lendacky@....com, bp@...en8.de, x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: mingo@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
 pgonda@...gle.com, seanjc@...gle.com, pbonzini@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC
 enabled guests

On 10/23/2024 8:55 AM, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> On 10/21/2024 1:51 PM, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>> Secure TSC enabled guests should not write to MSR_IA32_TSC(10H) register as
>> the subsequent TSC value reads are undefined. MSR_IA32_TSC read/write
>> accesses should not exit to the hypervisor for such guests.
>>
>> Accesses to MSR_IA32_TSC needs special handling in the #VC handler for the
>> guests with Secure TSC enabled. Writes to MSR_IA32_TSC should be ignored,
>> and reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the result of the RDTSC
>> instruction.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
>> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
>> Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
>> index 965209067f03..2ad7773458c0 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
>> @@ -1308,6 +1308,30 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
>>           return ES_OK;
>>       }
>>   +    /*
>> +     * TSC related accesses should not exit to the hypervisor when a
>> +     * guest is executing with SecureTSC enabled, so special handling
>> +     * is required for accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC:
>> +     *
>> +     * Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads
>> +     *         of the TSC to return undefined values, so ignore all
>> +     *         writes.
>> +     * Reads:  Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC
>> +     *         value, use the value returned by RDTSC.
>> +     */
> 
> Why doesn't handle it by returning ES_VMM_ERROR when hypervisor intercepts
> RD/WR of MSR_IA32_TSC? With SECURE_TSC enabled, it seems not need to be
> intercepted.

ES_VMM_ERROR will terminate the guest, which is not the expected behaviour. As
documented, writes to the MSR is ignored and reads are done using RDTSC.

> I think the reason is that SNP guest relies on interception to do the ignore
> behavior for WRMSR in #VC handler because the writing leads to undefined
> result.

For legacy and secure guests MSR_IA32_TSC is always intercepted(for both RD/WR).
Moreover, this is a legacy MSR, RDTSC and RDTSCP is the what modern OSes should
use. The idea is the catch any writes to TSC MSR and handle them gracefully.

> Then the question is what if the hypervisor doesn't intercept write to
> MSR_IA32_TSC in the first place?

I have tried to disable interception of MSR_IA32_TSC, and writes are ignored by
the HW as well. I would like to continue the current documented HW as per the APM.

Regards,
Nikunj