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Message-ID: <20151206132657.Horde.rQvtH4bu51mT83V1RAKxWA1@ltc.linux.ibm.com>
Date: Sun, 06 Dec 2015 13:26:57 -0500
From: dwilder@...ibm.com
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: predeep@...ibm.com, mjtarsel@...ibm.com
Subject: Double free of dst_entry in ipv4_dst_destroy()
Hi-
I am seeing a crash on a distro V4.2.3 kernel caused by a double
release of a dst_entry. In ipv4_dst_destroy() the call to
list_empty() finds a poisoned next pointer, indicating the dst_entry
has already been removed from the list and freed. The crash occurs
18 to 24 hours into a run of a network stress exerciser.
[172135.963496] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at
address 0x00100108 << poison value
[172135.963913] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000097f5ac
[172135.964184] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[172135.964327] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
[172135.964649] Modules linked in: iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables
bnx2x cxlflash cxl mdio ses libcrc32c enclosure uio_pdrv_genirq uio
powernv_rng sunrpc autofs4 ipr
[172135.965403] CPU: 51 PID: 65452 Comm: hxecpu Tainted: G W
4.2.3 #2
[172135.965482] task: c000001d8a370ff0 ti: c000001e2d57c000 task.ti:
c000001e2d57c000
[172135.965564] NIP: c00000000097f5ac LR: c00000000097f59c CTR:
0000000000000000
[172135.965664] REGS: c000001e2d57f8e0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G
W (4.2.3)
[172135.965782] MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR:
22322442 XER: 00000000
[172135.966033] CFAR: c000000000008468 DAR: 0000000000100108 DSISR:
42000000 SOFTE: 1
GPR00: c00000000097f59c c000001e2d57fb60
c00000000151ad00 c000001e504de300
GPR04: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
c000001fff8af370 c00000000141ad00
GPR08: c0000000016aad00 0000000000200200
0000000000100100 3d7473696c5f6465
GPR12: 6531303030303063 c000000007b5e480
0000000000000012 0000000000000001
GPR16: 0000000000000000 c000000001431280
c000000000ad38f0 7fffffffffffffff
GPR20: 0000000000000000 c000001e28caf000
c000001e2d57c000 c000000001429b80
GPR24: 000000000000000a 0000000000000000
c000001e504ddb30 0000000000000000
GPR28: 0000000000000000 c000001e2d57c000
c000001e504de300 c000001e28caf000 <<< pointer to dst
[172135.967772] NIP [c00000000097f5ac] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x8c/0xc0
[172135.967921] LR [c00000000097f59c] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x7c/0xc0
[172135.968076] Call Trace:
[172135.968133] [c000001e2d57fb60] [c00000000097f59c]
ipv4_dst_destroy+0x7c/0xc0 (unreliable)
[172135.968306] [c000001e2d57fbd0] [c00000000093b8e0] dst_destroy+0xf0/0x1a0
[172135.968452] [c000001e2d57fc10] [c00000000093bc68]
dst_destroy_rcu+0x28/0x50
[172135.968600] [c000001e2d57fc40] [c0000000001397a0]
rcu_process_callbacks+0x340/0x6f0
[172135.968768] [c000001e2d57fcf0] [c0000000000ba7d8] __do_softirq+0x188/0x3a0
[172135.968913] [c000001e2d57fde0] [c0000000000bac68] irq_exit+0xc8/0x100
[172135.969056] [c000001e2d57fe00] [c00000000001f734]
timer_interrupt+0xa4/0xe0
[172135.969223] [c000001e2d57fe30] [c000000000002714]
decrementer_common+0x114/0x180
[172135.969395] Instruction dump:
[172135.969492] 7fe5fb78 38842968 7fc6f378 3863e580 4811c989 60000000
7fc3f378 481154c1
[172135.969748] 60000000 e93f00b8 e95f00b0 7fc3f378 <f92a0008>
f9490000 3d200010 61290100
[172135.970009] ---[ end trace 34f3693ddc2d5aea ]---
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I added a call to dump_stack() into dst_release() in an attempt to
catch the two calls to dst_release().
-- a/net/core/dst.c
+++ b/net/core/dst.c
@@ -307,6 +307,12 @@ void dst_release(struct dst_entry *dst)
net_warn_ratelimited("%s: dst:%p refcnt:%d\n",
__func__, dst, newrefcnt);
if (!newrefcnt && unlikely(dst->flags & DST_NOCACHE))
+
+ if (!list_empty(&rt->rt_uncached)) {
+ printk("%s: dst=%p\n",__func__,dst);
+ dump_stack();
+ }
+
call_rcu(&dst->rcu_head, dst_destroy_rcu);
}
}
I got lucky and caught the following stack traces on my next run.
[26211.699357] tcp_v4_do_rcv: sk=c000001d10a00000 skb=c000001d22c61d00
dst=c000001d22c62500 sk->sk_rx_dst=c000001d22c62500
[26211.699527] dst_release: dst=c000001d22c62500
[26211.699626] CPU: 51 PID: 23317 Comm: hxecom Tainted: G W
4.2.3 #4
[26211.699632] Call Trace:
[26211.699678] [c000001cf0387440] [c000000000a9dcd4]
dump_stack+0x90/0xbc (unreliable)
[26211.699829] [c000001cf0387470] [c00000000093bf80] dst_release+0x110/0x120
[26211.699875] [c000001cf03874e0] [c0000000009b4024] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x4d4/0x4f0
[26211.699979] [c000001cf0387580] [c0000000009b7834] tcp_v4_rcv+0xb74/0xb90
[26211.700027] [c000001cf0387660] [c000000000984bb8]
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x178/0x350
[26211.700123] [c000001cf03876b0] [c0000000009853bc]
ip_local_deliver+0x4c/0x120
[26211.700181] [c000001cf0387720] [c000000000984eb4] ip_rcv_finish+0x124/0x420
[26211.700255] [c000001cf03877a0] [c0000000009857a4] ip_rcv+0x314/0x440
[26211.700312] [c000001cf0387830] [c00000000092b094]
__netif_receive_skb_core+0xa14/0xd60
[26211.700334] [c000001cf0387910] [c00000000092e924]
netif_receive_skb_internal+0x34/0xd0
[26211.700370] [c000001cf0387950] [c00000000092fa5c]
napi_gro_receive+0xec/0x1b0
[26211.700449] [c000001cf0387990] [d0000000165a59f0]
bnx2x_rx_int+0x1450/0x1700 [bnx2x]
[26211.700524] [c000001cf0387b30] [d0000000165a6580]
bnx2x_poll+0x310/0x440 [bnx2x]
[26211.700551] [c000001cf0387be0] [c00000000092f0dc] net_rx_action+0x2dc/0x470
[26211.700565] [c000001cf0387cf0] [c0000000000ba7d8] __do_softirq+0x188/0x3a0
[26211.700629] [c000001cf0387de0] [c0000000000bac68] irq_exit+0xc8/0x100
[26211.700657] [c000001cf0387e00] [c00000000001f734] timer_interrupt+0xa4/0xe0
[26211.700664] [c000001cf0387e30] [c000000000002714]
decrementer_common+0x114/0x180
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[26211.700709] tcp_v4_do_rcv: sk=c000001d10a00000 skb=c000001d22c61d00
dst=c000001d22c62500 sk->sk_rx_dst=c000001d22c62500
[26211.700713] dst_release: dst=c000001d22c62500
[26211.700719] CPU: 34 PID: 23342 Comm: hxecom Tainted: G W
4.2.3 #4
[26211.700726] Call Trace:
[26211.700735] [c000001cf4a97920] [c000000000a9dcd4]
dump_stack+0x90/0xbc (unreliable)
[26211.700742] [c000001cf4a97950] [c00000000093bf80] dst_release+0x110/0x120
[26211.700749] [c000001cf4a979c0] [c0000000009b4024] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x4d4/0x4f0
[26211.700759] [c000001cf4a97a60] [c00000000090c72c] release_sock+0xec/0x1e0
[26211.700772] [c000001cf4a97ab0] [c000000000998b98] tcp_recvmsg+0x3f8/0xce0
[26211.700778] [c000001cf4a97bd0] [c0000000009d31dc] inet_recvmsg+0x9c/0x110
[26211.700785] [c000001cf4a97c30] [c000000000906d24] sock_recvmsg+0x84/0xb0
[26211.700794] [c000001cf4a97c70] [c0000000009088ac] SyS_recvfrom+0xdc/0x1a0
[26211.700802] [c000001cf4a97dc0] [c000000000909a38]
SyS_socketcall+0x2d8/0x430
[26211.700809] [c000001cf4a97e30] [c000000000009204] system_call+0x38/0xb4
(Corresponding Oops message cut out for brevity, the double free
occurred on dst_entry c000001d22c62500, same entry as in both the
above traces.)
This is what I think is happening:
In the first thread tcp_v4_do_rcv() calls dst_release(), the reference
count becomes zero scheduling a rcu callback of dst_destroy_rcu() and
setting sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL.
tcp_rcv_established() is called from tcp_v4_do_rcv(), finding
sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL it re-referencing the same dst_entry from
skb->_skb_refdst taking a reference, the reference count is now 1 .
At this point dst_destroy_rcu() is scheduled to run against a
dst_entry that has a reference count of 1!
The second thread (a user read) follows the same path calling
dst_release() and scheduling a second callback for the same dst_entry
eventually causing the crash when the callback runs.
To test my theory I added the following check in tcp_v4_do_rcv().
---------------
If the dst released is the same dst as in skb->refdst, skip the call
to dst_release().
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index db00343..7f058f9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -1377,8 +1377,10 @@ int tcp_v4_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (dst) {
if (inet_sk(sk)->rx_dst_ifindex != skb->skb_iif ||
!dst->ops->check(dst, 0)) {
- dst_release(dst);
- sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL;
+ if (dst != skb_dst(skb)) {
+ dst_release(dst);
+ sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL;
+ }
}
}
tcp_rcv_established(sk, skb, tcp_hdr(skb), skb->len);
With this change the test has run for 48 hours with out a crash. I
don't fully understand the conditions that must occur to set this up,
therefor this may be a workaround not a fix. What are your thoughts?
David Wilder
dwilder@...ibm.com
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