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Message-ID: <20230927055051.GC224399@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Sep 2023 07:50:51 +0200
From: Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>
To: Jordan Rife <jrife@...gle.com>
Cc: davem@...emloft.net, edumazet@...gle.com, kuba@...nel.org,
pabeni@...hat.com, willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, dborkman@...nel.org, pablo@...filter.org,
kadlec@...filter.org, fw@...len.de, santosh.shilimkar@...cle.com,
ast@...nel.org, rdna@...com, stable@...r.kernel.org,
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net v5 2/3] net: prevent rewrite of msg_name in
sock_sendmsg()
On Thu, Sep 21, 2023 at 06:46:41PM -0500, Jordan Rife wrote:
> Callers of sock_sendmsg(), and similarly kernel_sendmsg(), in kernel
> space may observe their value of msg_name change in cases where BPF
> sendmsg hooks rewrite the send address. This has been confirmed to break
> NFS mounts running in UDP mode and has the potential to break other
> systems.
>
> This patch:
>
> 1) Creates a new function called __sock_sendmsg() with same logic as the
> old sock_sendmsg() function.
> 2) Replaces calls to sock_sendmsg() made by __sys_sendto() and
> __sys_sendmsg() with __sock_sendmsg() to avoid an unnecessary copy,
> as these system calls are already protected.
> 3) Modifies sock_sendmsg() so that it makes a copy of msg_name if
> present before passing it down the stack to insulate callers from
> changes to the send address.
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230912013332.2048422-1-jrife@google.com/
> Fixes: 1cedee13d25a ("bpf: Hooks for sys_sendmsg")
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>
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