netdev - Re: [PATCH nf] netfilter: handle the connecting collision properly in nf_conntrack_proto

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Message-ID: <ZRwMwFgCCM3nMeBG@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 14:44:48 +0200
From: Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>
To: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
Cc: network dev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org, davem@...emloft.net, kuba@...nel.org,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
	Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>,
	Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@...filter.org>,
	Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
	Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH nf] netfilter: handle the connecting collision properly
 in nf_conntrack_proto_sctp

On Sun, Oct 01, 2023 at 11:07:48AM -0400, Xin Long wrote:
> In Scenario A and B below, as the delayed INIT_ACK always changes the peer
> vtag, SCTP ct with the incorrect vtag may cause packet loss.
> 
> Scenario A: INIT_ACK is delayed until the peer receives its own INIT_ACK
> 
>   192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: [INIT] [init tag: 1328086772]
>     192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: [INIT] [init tag: 1414468151]
>     192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: [INIT ACK] [init tag: 1328086772]
>   192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: [INIT ACK] [init tag: 1650211246] *
>   192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: [COOKIE ECHO]
>     192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: [COOKIE ECHO]
>     192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: [COOKIE ACK]
> 
> Scenario B: INIT_ACK is delayed until the peer completes its own handshake
> 
>   192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3922216408]
>     192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 144230885]
>     192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3922216408]
>     192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
>     192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]
>   192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3914796021] *
> 
> This patch fixes it as below:
> 
> In SCTP_CID_INIT processing:
> - clear ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir] if ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] &&
>   ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir]. (Scenario E)
> - set ct->proto.sctp.init[dir].
> 
> In SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK processing:
> - drop it if !ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir] && ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] &&
>   ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] != ih->init_tag. (Scenario B, Scenario C)
> - drop it if ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] && ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir] &&
>   ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] != ih->init_tag. (Scenario A)
> 
> In SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ACK processing:
> - clear ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] and ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir]. (Scenario D)
> 
> Also, it's important to allow the ct state to move forward with cookie_echo
> and cookie_ack from the opposite dir for the collision scenarios.
> 
> There are also other Scenarios where it should allow the packet through,
> addressed by the processing above:
> 
> Scenario C: new CT is created by INIT_ACK.
> 
> Scenario D: start INIT on the existing ESTABLISHED ct.
> 
> Scenario E: start INIT after the old collision on the existing ESTABLISHED ct.
> 
>   192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 3922216408]
>   192.168.1.1 > 192.168.1.2: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 144230885]
>   (both side are stopped, then start new connection again in hours)
>   192.168.1.2 > 192.168.1.1: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 242308742]
> 
> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>

Hi,

as a fix I wonder if this warrants a Fixes tag.
Perhaps our old friend:

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")