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Message-ID: <CANn89iJk5RJR=ex6t3-hzpo=08_+RMQJD5NL3-RzTyK_FutAMQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 1 May 2024 08:56:51 +0200
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
To: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
Cc: anderson@...elesecurity.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: use-after-free warnings in tcp_v4_connect() due to
inet_twsk_hashdance() inserting the object into ehash table without
initializing its reference counter
On Wed, May 1, 2024 at 2:22 AM Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com> wrote:
>
> +cc Eric
>
> From: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@...elesecurity.com>
> Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 19:00:34 -0300
> > Hello,
>
> Hi,
>
> Thanks for the detailed report.
>
> >
> > There is a bug in inet_twsk_hashdance(). This function inserts a
> > time-wait socket in the established hash table without initializing the
> > object's reference counter, as seen below. The reference counter
> > initialization is done after the object is added to the established hash
> > table and the lock is released. Because of this, a sock_hold() in
> > tcp_twsk_unique() and other operations on the object trigger warnings
> > from the reference counter saturation mechanism. The warnings can also
> > be seen below. They were triggered on Fedora 39 Linux kernel v6.8.
> >
> > The bug is triggered via a connect() system call on a TCP socket,
> > reaching __inet_check_established() and then passing the time-wait
> > socket to tcp_twsk_unique(). Other operations are also performed on the
> > time-wait socket in __inet_check_established() before its reference
> > counter is initialized correctly by inet_twsk_hashdance(). The fix seems
> > to be to move the reference counter initialization inside the lock,
>
> or use refcount_inc_not_zero() and give up on reusing the port
> under the race ?
>
> ---8<---
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> index 0427deca3e0e..637f4965326d 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> @@ -175,8 +175,13 @@ int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sktw, void *twp)
> tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = tcptw->tw_ts_recent;
> tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp;
> }
> - sock_hold(sktw);
> - return 1;
> +
> + /* Here, sk_refcnt could be 0 because inet_twsk_hashdance() puts
> + * twsk into ehash and releases the bucket lock *before* setting
> + * sk_refcnt. Then, give up on reusing the port.
> + */
> + if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&sktw->sk_refcnt)))
> + return 1;
> }
>
Thanks for CC me.
Nice analysis from Anderson ! Have you found this with a fuzzer ?
This patch would avoid the refcount splat, but would leave side
effects on tp, I am too lazy to double check them.
Incidentally, I think we have to annotate data-races on
tcptw->tw_ts_recent and tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp
Perhaps something like this instead ?
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 0427deca3e0eb9239558aa124a41a1525df62a04..f1e3707d0b33180a270e6d3662d4cf17a4f72bb8
100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -155,6 +155,10 @@ int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock
*sktw, void *twp)
if (tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp &&
(!twp || (reuse && time_after32(ktime_get_seconds(),
tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp)))) {
+
+ if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&sktw->sk_refcnt))
+ return 0;
+
/* In case of repair and re-using TIME-WAIT sockets we still
* want to be sure that it is safe as above but honor the
* sequence numbers and time stamps set as part of the repair
@@ -175,7 +179,6 @@ int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock
*sktw, void *twp)
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = tcptw->tw_ts_recent;
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp;
}
- sock_hold(sktw);
return 1;
}
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