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Message-ID: <8922b6e4-1804-4d6a-b7e5-cd4fe1623ff1@allelesecurity.com>
Date: Wed, 1 May 2024 08:30:15 -0300
From: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@...elesecurity.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: use-after-free warnings in tcp_v4_connect() due to
inet_twsk_hashdance() inserting the object into ehash table without
initializing its reference counter
On 5/1/24 03:56, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Wed, May 1, 2024 at 2:22 AM Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com> wrote:
>>
>> +cc Eric
>>
>> From: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@...elesecurity.com>
>> Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 19:00:34 -0300
>>> Hello,
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Thanks for the detailed report.
>>
>>>
>>> There is a bug in inet_twsk_hashdance(). This function inserts a
>>> time-wait socket in the established hash table without initializing the
>>> object's reference counter, as seen below. The reference counter
>>> initialization is done after the object is added to the established hash
>>> table and the lock is released. Because of this, a sock_hold() in
>>> tcp_twsk_unique() and other operations on the object trigger warnings
>>> from the reference counter saturation mechanism. The warnings can also
>>> be seen below. They were triggered on Fedora 39 Linux kernel v6.8.
>>>
>>> The bug is triggered via a connect() system call on a TCP socket,
>>> reaching __inet_check_established() and then passing the time-wait
>>> socket to tcp_twsk_unique(). Other operations are also performed on the
>>> time-wait socket in __inet_check_established() before its reference
>>> counter is initialized correctly by inet_twsk_hashdance(). The fix seems
>>> to be to move the reference counter initialization inside the lock,
>>
>> or use refcount_inc_not_zero() and give up on reusing the port
>> under the race ?
>>
>> ---8<---
>> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
>> index 0427deca3e0e..637f4965326d 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
>> @@ -175,8 +175,13 @@ int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sktw, void *twp)
>> tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = tcptw->tw_ts_recent;
>> tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp;
>> }
>> - sock_hold(sktw);
>> - return 1;
>> +
>> + /* Here, sk_refcnt could be 0 because inet_twsk_hashdance() puts
>> + * twsk into ehash and releases the bucket lock *before* setting
>> + * sk_refcnt. Then, give up on reusing the port.
>> + */
>> + if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&sktw->sk_refcnt)))
>> + return 1;
>> }
>>
>
> Thanks for CC me.
>
> Nice analysis from Anderson ! Have you found this with a fuzzer ?
I ran the reproducer of a bug found by syzkaller on an older kernel, and
this issue was triggered. Analyzing it, I discovered it had nothing to
do with the problem the reproducer aimed to trigger, and it was present
upstream. I rewrote the reproducer and triggered it on v6.8 to confirm.
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=278279efdd2730dd14bf
>
> This patch would avoid the refcount splat, but would leave side
> effects on tp, I am too lazy to double check them.
>
> Incidentally, I think we have to annotate data-races on
> tcptw->tw_ts_recent and tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp
>
> Perhaps something like this instead ?
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> index 0427deca3e0eb9239558aa124a41a1525df62a04..f1e3707d0b33180a270e6d3662d4cf17a4f72bb8
> 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> @@ -155,6 +155,10 @@ int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock
> *sktw, void *twp)
> if (tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp &&
> (!twp || (reuse && time_after32(ktime_get_seconds(),
> tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp)))) {
> +
> + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&sktw->sk_refcnt))
> + return 0;
> +
> /* In case of repair and re-using TIME-WAIT sockets we still
> * want to be sure that it is safe as above but honor the
> * sequence numbers and time stamps set as part of the repair
> @@ -175,7 +179,6 @@ int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock
> *sktw, void *twp)
> tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = tcptw->tw_ts_recent;
> tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp;
> }
> - sock_hold(sktw);
> return 1;
> }
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